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THE THIRD DEATH OF FEDERALISM
A. Christopher Bryant*
ABSTRACT
Federal drug laws proved a stumbling block to the Rehnquist
Court's attempted federalism revival. In its final year, the Court's frag-
ile federalism coalition splintered in a pair of cases arising under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Missing from the emerging legal liter-
ature concerning those two decisions is any substantive discussion of the
Supreme Court's much earlier, ill-fated efforts to preserve both judicial
enforcement of the enumerated powers doctrine and federal narcotics
laws. This article fills that gap.
Ninety-odd years ago the Court arrived at the same jurisprudential
juncture it now confronts. In the early decades of the twentieth century,
the White and Taft Courts similarly faltered when the Justices professed
dedication to federalism was tested by congressional overreaching in the
name of guarding the people from narcotics and other temptations to
perceived moral vices. In sustaining what the Justices no doubt believed
to be laudatory federal morals regulations, they sowed the seeds of fed-
eralism's first death twenty years later. For during the constitutional
crisis of the 1930s, the Court's critics pointed to this earlier compromise
of federalism principles in their efforts to expose as pre-textual the
Court's invalidation of New Deal legislation on the ground that it ex-
ceeded Congress's enumerated powers.
This article explores the parallels between the neglected history of
federal narcotics laws and the Court's recent rulings in Gonzales v.
Raich and Gonzales v. Oregon. The full significance of those decisions
can be perceived only when they are viewed in the light cast by the tur-
bulent history offederal narcotics regulation. Then and now, drug abuse
provokes intense reactions, both physical and emotional. The history
suggests that now, as then, the Court's decisions may prove more
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portentous than they might at first appear. In addition, this parallel also
begs more general questions about the feasibility of judicial efforts to
enforce federalism. The final part of this article identifies and ventures
some preliminary reflections on these issues.
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INTRODUCTION
For nearly a century, the Supreme Court has had a serious drug
problem. In the Rehnquist Court's final year, its fragile federalism coali-
tion splintered in two cases arising under the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA). Ninety-odd years earlier, the Justices, then struggling to preserve
federalism, had likewise succumbed to the lure of narcotics. The ne-
glected history of early federal drug regulation reveals the Court's recent
rulings to be far more significant than they might appear.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Court compro-
mised its efforts to limit Congress to its enumerated powers in order to
sustain what the Justices no doubt perceived to be salutary federal morals
regulations. Throughout this period, the Court struggled to reconcile its
continued commitment to federalism enforcement with the broad read-
ings it had accorded Congress's enumerated powers in sustaining vice
laws. In a striking parallel to recent controversies, the White and Taft
Courts' most problematic rulings came in cases pitting federal narcotics
laws against the states' reserved powers to govern public morality and
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medical practice. Over time, it became increasingly clear to both the
Court's critics and the Justices themselves that the Court's strict con-
struction of Congress's enumerated powers in the context of federal stat-
utes regulating workings conditions and terms of employment could not
be squared with its decisions upholding federal criminal statutes restrict-
ing lotteries, alcohol, sexual morality, and (most plainly) narcotics use.
Ultimately, this inconsistency exposed the Court's federalism decisions
as nothing more than the reflections of the Justices' own policy prefer-
ences, leading in the late 1930s and early 1940s to the tacit but nonethe-
less complete abdication of any judicial effort to limit the scope of
congressional authority. This was the first death of federalism. Though
the climatic clashes and consequent concessions came during the New
Deal Era, a review of earlier federalism rulings discloses that this crisis
was a long time in the making.
After nearly four decades interment, judicial federalism-albeit as a
protection of the "States Qua States" rather than as a energetic enumer-
ated powers doctrine-was briefly revived in then-Justice Rehnquist's
1976 opinion for a bare majority of the Court in National League of
Cities v. Usery.' A mere nine years later, in Garcia v. Metropolitan
Transit Authorily,2 the Court expressly overruled National League of Cit-
ies, concluding that "the principal means chosen by the Framers to en-
sure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the
Federal Government itself."'3
A decade later, Rehnquist, now Chief Justice, finally secured a bare
majority willing to reassert some judicial role in limiting Congress to its
enumerated powers. In United States v. Lopez, the "federalism five"
shocked the legal community by invalidating a federal statute as beyond
Congress's Commerce Clause authority--the first time the Court had
so held since 1936.4 Only two years later, the Court invalidated the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act on the ground that, insofar as it sought
to affect the actions of state governments, it exceeded Congress's power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 At the end of the century, the
same five Justices who formed the majority in Lopez joined again to hold
that Congress lacked constitutional authority to pass the civil-remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act.6 It seemed that the Court
was on the cusp of a federalism counter-revolution.
1 426 U.S. 833, 847, 856 (1976).
2 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
3 Id. at 550. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism,
83 MIcH. L. REv. 1709 (1985) (discussing the 1985 overruling of Nat'l League of Cities).
4 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
6 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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But as quickly as the movement mobilized, it came upon the same
stumbling block that had proved fatal to similar efforts ninety years
before-the federal anti-narcotics laws, now embodied in the CSA. By
the twenty-first century, increasing public (and professional) recognition
of marijuana's occasional medicinal value, as well as decreasing public
support for the seemingly futile war on drugs, resulted in nine states au-
thorizing limited medical use of marijuana. 7 At the same time, "through-
out the Nation, Americans [were] engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide." 8 As part of that debate Oregon voters repeatedly endorsed a
ballot initiative creating a legal mechanism for "Death with Dignity."
Attorney General John Ashcroft, who had previously been in the van-
guard of federalism's renaissance, 9 proved no fan of either state innova-
tion. His Justice Department aggressively enforced the CSA against
those who sought to take advantage of this liberalization of state mari-
juana laws.10 Moreover, reversing the position taken by his predecessor,
Ashcroft, in November 2001, issued an "Interpretative Rule" construing
the CSA to forbid physicians from acting in accordance with the Oregon
assisted suicide law."' In short, Ashcroft found, in this one federal stat-
ute, authority to halt all state experimentation on either controversial
subject.
The medical marijuana issue came to the Supreme Court first in the
case of Gonzales v. Raich.12 Three of the federalism five proved immu-
table. But Justices Scalia and Kennedy, acting as spoilers, sided with the
four Lopez and Morrison dissenters and sustained the application of the
CSA to persons possessing marijuana for legal, medicinal purposes. 13
The Raich holding swept aside the contrary laws of nine states, which
reflected the collective judgment (often expressed directly via ballot ini-
tiative) of tens of millions of voters in those states. 14 In Lopez, Flores,
and Morrison, Justices Scalia and Kennedy supplied essential support to
7 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
8 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). In rejecting the claim that the
federal constitution required access to physician-assisted suicide, the Court stressed that "the
States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide
and other similar issues," id. at 719, and that "[o]ur holding permits this [earnest and profound]
debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." Id. at 735. And so it did, until
preempted by Attorney General Ashcroft's reinterpretation of the CSA. See infra text accom-
panying note 313.
9 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (upholding a mandatory retirement
requirement for state court judges in Missouri's state constitution).
10 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 7 (2005).
11 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004), affd, Gonzales v.Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006).
12 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
13 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14 See id. at 1.
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the Court's efforts to revive some meaningful judicial enforcement of the
enumerated powers doctrine. 15 But Gonzales v. Raich revealed that, like
Attorney General Ashcroft, they were selectively neglectful of this com-
mitment when confronted with a conspicuous clash with their social
conservatism.
Six months later, the Court, this time in an opinion by Justice Ken-
nedy, sided with Oregon in the assisted suicide controversy. 16 The most
significant opinion was Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion for himself,
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, in which Scalia made explicit
what had been inchoate in Raich: Congress's enumerated powers could
be stretched in the service of protecting public morality. 17 His opinion
echoed the voices of the White and Taft Court Justices who unknowingly
laid the foundation for the New Deal Court's abandonment of federalism
enforcement. Raich and Gonzales v. Oregon, therefore, constitute the
third death of federalism.
In the commentary these two cases have already generated, 18 their
striking parallel with the early twentieth-century narcotics decisions has
15 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 507 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000).
16 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
17 Id. at 275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18 See, e.g., George D. Brown, Counterrevolution ?-Federal Criminal Law After Raich,
66 OHIo ST. L.J. 947 (2005); Paul Chen, The Informational Role of Amici Curiae Briefs in
Gonzales v. Raich, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 217 (2007); David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legis-
lative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IowA L. REv. 41 (2006); Jenny Miao Jiang,
Regulating Litigation under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Economic Activ-
ity or Regulatory Nullity?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 537 (2007); Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v.
Raich: Wickard v. Filburn Displaced, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2004-2005, at 71; Alex Kreit,
Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705 (2006); Ronald A. Lindsay et al., Hastened
Death and the Regulation of the Practice of Medicine, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1 (2006);
Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 906 (2006); Ilya Somin, A False Dawn For Federalism: Clear Statement Rules
After Gonzales v. Raich, CATO SuP. CT. REV., 2005-2006, at 113; George Steven Swan, The
Law and Economics of State-Sanctioned Medical Marijuana: Gonzales v. Raich, 7 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 473 (2006); Symposium, Federalism After Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEwis &
CLARK L. REv. 743 (2005); Symposium, Federalism Past, Federalism Future, 21 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 447 (2007); Symposium, A Tale of (at Least) Two Federalisms, 50
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 615 (2005-2006); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doc-
trine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, SUp. CT. REV., 2005, at 1; Jordan
Goldberg, Note, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why Progressives Might
Be Tempted to Embrace Federalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (2006); Emily P. Hughes,
Note, The Oregon Death with Dignity Act: Relief of Suffering at the End of Medicine's Ability
to Heal, 95 GEO. L.J. 207 (2006); Mollie Lee, Note, Environmental Economics: A Market
Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456 (2006); Tara M. Stuckey, Note,
Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of
Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2101 (2006). See also infra notes 323-24 and
accompanying text for discussion of the legal literature concerning the Raich and Oregon
decisions.
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been ignored. 19 This article attempts to fill that gap. The first part of the
article reviews the overlooked history of judicial federalism and federal
morals regulation ninety years ago. Part II briefly summarizes the Rehn-
quist Court's federalism revival at the century's end. Part III treats the
Court's recent decisions in the medical marijuana and assisted suicide
cases, stressing the parallels between these rulings and the Court's early
twentieth-century missteps. In Part IV, the article concludes with obser-
vations and hypotheses about the significance of this correlation.
I. THE FIRST DEATH OF FEDERALISM
The struggle in Raich between the Justices' commitments to feder-
alism and socially conservative ideology, as well as the triumph of the
latter over the former, echoed early twentieth-century Supreme Court rul-
ings concerning the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914.20 As summa-
rily characterized by the Raich majority, that statute, albeit "in the guise
of' a revenue law,2 1 in fact constituted Congress's first foray into regula-
tion of narcotics use.
A. FEDERAL NARCOTICS REGULATION IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH
CENTURY
Criminal prohibition of narcotics possession is a twentieth-century
phenomenon. Indeed, less than ten years passed between the New York
legislature's enactment of its first major narcotics law and the passage of
the Harrison Act in 1914.22 A principal goal of the Harrison Act was to
fulfill U.S. commitments made in the Hague International Opium Con-
ventions of 1911 & 1913.23 Accordingly, the subject of federal narcotics
19 My research disclosed no existing treatment of the similarity between Raich and Ore-
gon and the early twentieth-century narcotics cases.
20 Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 785, §§ 1-12 (1914), amended by 40 Stat. 1130, § 1006 (1919)
(repealed 1939).
21 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).
22 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 355
(1993) (observing that in the nineteenth century drug laws "hardly mattered," and addiction
and the sale and use of narcotics was not a crime, which changed radically in the twentieth
century, and specifically identifying a 1905 New York statute declaring "cocaine, morphine,
and opium to be 'poisons,' not to be sold at retail without a warning label" as exemplary of the
earliest modem state narcotics laws). See generally Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on
Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 1305, 1312
(1983) (discussing earliest state and federal criminal prohibitions on the non-medical distribu-
tion of cocaine); STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINK-
ING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993); H. WAYNE MORGAN, DRUGS IN AMERICA:
A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1800-1980 (1981); DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS
OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973); STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOM-
ING A FAILED PUBLIC POLICY 179 (1990).
23 See Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV.
483, 498-506 (1997); see also Aryeh Y. Brown, Commentary, In Memoriam: Ralph Seeley;
Obscured by Smoke: Medicinal Marijuana and The Need for Representation Reinforcement
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regulation fell within the jurisdiction of President Wilson's Secretary of
State, William Jennings Bryan. A political dynamo as well as a self-
proclaimed exemplar of traditional, Protestant morality,24 Bryan proved
to be one of the Harrison Act's most fervent and effective supporters.
Even so, as enacted, the statute apparently was only meant to effect a
regime of dealer registration rather than narcotics prohibition.25
That was the reading the Supreme Court gave the Act in United
States v. Jin Fuey Moy.26 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes dis-
missed an indictment that charged a conspiracy to possess morphine
without a valid physician's prescription.2 7 Holmes concluded that the
statute did not apply to mere possession by persons not engaged in pro-
ducing or dealing narcotics. 28 Invoking the canon that "[a] statute must
be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid ... grave doubts" as to the
law's constitutional validity,29 Holmes reasoned that "the gravest ques-
tion of power would be raised by an attempt of Congress to make posses-
sion of opium," produced in any of the states, "a crime."'30 Holmes
stressed that the Harrison Act authorized imposition of up to a five-year
term of imprisonment:
Only words from which there is no escape could warrant
the conclusion that Congress meant to strain its powers
almost if not quite to the breaking point in order to make
the probably very large proportion of citizens who have
some preparation of opium in their possession criminal
... and subject to the punishment made possible by [the
Act.]3 1
As construed by the Court, then, the Act sought merely to register, regu-
late, and tax persons engaged in the narcotics business. 32 The Act left
Review, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 175, 205-08 (1998) (discussing background to and enactment
of the Harrison Act).
24 See generally Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., 16 J.L. & RELIGION 951, 952 (2001)
(reviewing EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA'S
CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997)).
25 See Luna, supra note 23, at 506.
26 241 U.S. 394 (1916).
27 Id. at 402.
28 Id.
29 Id at 401.
30 Id. Holmes likewise dispensed with the government's claim that the Act, understood
as a regulatory measure, could be sustained as a means to carry into execution the Opium
Conventions. Holmes wrote, "The provision before us was not required by the opium conven-
tion, and whether this section is entitled to the supremacy claimed by the government for
treaties is, to say the least, another grave question; and, if it is reasonably possible, the act
should be read so as to avoid [it]." Id.
31 Id. at 402.
32 The Harrison Act, in pertinent part, provided "[tihat it shall be unlawful for any person
not registered under the provisions of this Act, and who has not paid the special tax provided
2007]
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untouched individual possession even (as the indictment alleged) when
held for non-medicinal purposes by "one addicted to the use of opium. 33
Foreshadowing trouble ahead, Justices Hughes and Pitney dissented, al-
beit without opinion.
34
Within three years the Court (Holmes included) reversed course.35
On March 3, 1919, the Court decided Webb v. United States36 and United
States v. Doremus37 in which the Justices both adopted a far broader
interpretation of the Harrison Act and affirmed the constitutionality of
the Act so construed. In both cases, Justice Day delivered the opinions
for the same, five-Justice majority. Webb emphatically rejected the
claim that the Act permitted physicians to prescribe narcotics to an addict
for the purpose of "keeping him comfortable by maintaining his custom-
ary use."' 38 As a substitute for reasoned explanation of this conclusion,
Justice Day sputtered indignantly that "to call such an order ... a physi-
cian's prescription would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no
discussion of the subject is required. '39 Nor did Justice Day so much as
acknowledge, let alone distinguish, Jin Fuey Moy. Webb theoretically
left intact Jin Fuey Moy's holding that mere possession of narcotics by a
user was not itself a violation of the Harrison Act. As construed in
Webb, however, the Act made it a federal crime to supply the user with
the drug. 40 In practical effect, Webb rendered meaningless the limitation
Holmes had, in service of federalism, grafted onto the Harrison Act in
Jin Fuey Moy.
In Doremus the Court rebuffed the claim that the Harrison Act, as
construed in Webb, exceeded Congress's power to tax. Justice Day's
opinion reasoned that the Act was within the ambit of congressional au-
thority so long as it had "some reasonable relation" to the raising of reve-
nue, even if the law's "effect [was] to accomplish another purpose as
for by this Act, to have in his possession or under his control any of the [covered] drugs,"
excepting "the possession of any of the aforesaid drugs which has or have been prescribed in
good faith by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon under this Act." Pub. L. No. 63-223,
§ 8, 38 Stat. 789 (1914). The Court "conclude[d] that 'any person not registered' in § 8 cannot
be taken to mean any person in the United States, but must be taken to refer to the class with
which the statute undertakes to deal, the persons who are required to register by § 1," Jin Fuey
Moy, 241 U.S. at 402, i.e., "every person who produces, imports, manufactures, compounds,
deals in, dispenses, sells, distributes, or gives away" the covered drugs. § 8, 38 Stat. 789.
33 Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. at 399.
34 Id. at 402.
35 Some have thoughtfully speculated as to the causes of this abrupt switch. See, e.g.,
Brown, supra note 23, at 210-11 (suggesting that World War I, the Eighteenth Amendment,
and the spirit of nationalism combined with the Red Scare to produce a "social upheaval" that
"undoubtedly influenced" the Court's 1919 rulings).
36 249 U.S. 96 (1919).
37 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
38 249 U.S. at 99.
39 Id. at 99-100.
40 Id. at 99.
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well."' 4' In other words, courts were not to inquire into congressional
motives.42 Applying these precepts, Justice Day eagerly endorsed the
fiction that the regulatory character of the Harrison Act was merely inci-
dental to its revenue raising function manifested solely in the statute's
imposition of a nominal $1 per annum tax.43 The Act's provisions con-
fining lawful sales to those made upon a physician's order in the course
of "legitimate" medical practice (a concept itself circumscribed by Webb
to exclude sustaining an addict) "tend[ed] to keep the traffic aboveboard
and subject to inspection by those authorized to collect the revenue,"
thereby "diminish[ing] the opportunity of unauthorized persons to obtain
the drugs and sell them clandestinely without paying the tax imposed by
the federal law." 44 After all, the very indictment before the Court
charged Doremus with supplying 500 one-sixth grain tablets of heroin to
"a person addicted to the use of the drug aforesaid as a habit, being a
person popularly known as a 'dope fiend.'- 4 5 Such a depraved individ-
ual, the Court speculated, might "not have used this great number of
doses for himself' but rather have "sold some to others without paying
the [$ 1 per annum] tax."'46 It was sufficient that "at least Congress may
have deemed it wise to prevent such possible dealings because of their
effect upon the collection of the revenue. '47 Thus, no later than 1919,
the Court discovered congressional authority to supplant any contrary
state law and impose a nationwide blanket prohibition on the sale of nar-
cotics to be enforced with severe criminal penalties, excepting only dis-
tribution that the Treasury Department (and the Court) deemed to be "in
the regular course of the professional practice of medicine. '48
In a laconic (one-sentence) dissenting opinion, Chief Justice White,
joined by Justices McKenna, Van Devanter, and McReynolds, endorsed
the opinion that:
[T]he court below correctly held the act of Congress, in
so far as it embraced the matters complained of, to be
beyond the constitutional power of Congress to enact be-
cause to such extent the statute was a mere attempt by
41 Doremus, 249 U.S. at 94.
42 See id. at 93 ("[F]rom an early day the Court has held that the fact that other motives
may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into
that subject.").
43 Id. at 94-95.
44 Id. at 94.
45 United States v. Doremus, 246 F. 958, 959 (W.D. Tex. 1918) (quoting indictment),
rev'd, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
46 Doremus, 249 U.S. at 95.
47 Id.
48 Doremus, 246 F. at 959 (quoting indictment).
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Congress to exert a power not delegated, that is, the re-
served police power of the states.49
It is unfortunate that the Chief Justice did not write into his opinion more
of the lower court's reasoning, which was compelling and remains rele-
vant. Judge West's opinion in the case methodically demonstrated that
the provisions of the Act Doremus had been charged with violating "can
only be a police measure looking primarily to the protection of the public
against the abuse of this drug, not remotely serving as an aid or means to
effect the object of the act in respect of its revenue."'50 In particular,
Judge West explained that Doremus's indictment for sale "of the inhib-
ited drug, 'not in the regular course of his professional practice as a phy-
sician and not for the treatment of any disease from which a patient was
suffering,"' simply could not be believed ancillary to the collection of
taxes. 51 The Harrison Act imposed a merely "nominal" tax and then "so
restrict[ed] and narrow[ed] the uses of the drug that no vital or important
excess of revenue could reasonably be expected."'52 The Act also dic-
tated a "penalty for violating any provision of the [A]ct [ ] so dispropor-
tionate to the gravamen of the offense ... as to be further convincing that
Congress was more concerned with the moral ends to be subserved than
with the revenue to be derived."'53 In essence, Judge West and the four
Supreme Court dissenters were willing to acknowledge what all must
have known-as a tax law, the Harrison Act was a sham. Although a
bare majority of the Justices were willing to swallow the lie whole, in a
mere three years the Court would reassert the judiciary's obligation to
look behind such empty forms to a statute's actual effect.
Judicial deference to Congress's claimed purposes may be defensi-
ble, even laudable, in light of the relative institutional competence and
legitimacy of the national government's judiciary and legislature. But
selective deference is not deference at all; instead it is a disguise for
inchoate judicial policy judgments-avowedly the province of the legis-
lature. In the Child Labor Tax Case,54 the Court selectively abandoned
the posture of deference it had assumed in Doremus in favor of its per-
ceived obligation to assess independently whether the challenged law
"impose[d] a tax with only that incidental restraint and regulation which
a tax must inevitably involve" or whether the statute "regulate[d] by the
49 Doremus, 249 U.S. at 95 (White, C.J., dissenting).
50 Doremus, 246 F. at 963.
51 See id.
52 Id. at 964.
53 Id.
54 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
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use of the so-called tax as a penalty. 55 Writing for eight Justices, 56
Chief Justice Taft sententiously intoned that:
It is the high duty and function of this court in cases
regularly brought to its bar to decline to recognize or
enforce seeming laws of Congress, dealing with subjects
not intrusted to Congress, but left or committed by the
supreme law of the land to the control of the states. We
cannot avoid the duty, even though it require us to refuse
to give effect to legislation designed to promote the
highest good. The good sought in unconstitutional legis-
lation is an insidious feature, because it leads citizens
and legislators of good purpose to promote it, without
thought of the serious breach it will make in the ark of
our covenant, or the harm which will come from break-
ing down recognized standards. In the maintenance of
local self-government, on the one hand, and the national
power, on the other, our country has been able to endure
and prosper for near a century and a half.
57
Taft had little to say as to why this "high duty and function" did not
require the Court to invalidate the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act as well.
His opinion identified only one difference between the two statutes-
whereas the Child Labor Tax Law was "on the face of the act . . . a
penalty," 58 any ulterior motive that may have contributed to Congress's
passing of the narcotics law was "not shown on [its] face."'59 Even that
alleged difference ignored the unanswered conclusion of the Doremus
trial court and four Supreme Court dissenters: The terms of the Harrison
Act revealed that the law's actual purpose was narcotics regulation, not
revenue collection. 60
Justices McReynolds and Sutherland, perhaps among others, were
both aware of and troubled by the Court's inconsistency on federalism.
Three years after the Child Labor Tax Case, McReynolds wrote for a
unanimous Court in Linder v. United States, which reversed the criminal
conviction6 1 of a physician whose sole offense was to provide a known
addict with a relatively small quantity of narcotics for "the purpose of
[temporarily] relieving conditions incident to addiction. '62 In language
55 Id. at 36.
56 Justice Clarke dissented without opinion. See id. at 44.
57 Id. at 37.
58 Id. at 39.
59 Id. at 43.
60 See United States v. Doremus, 246 F. 958 (W.D. Tex. 1918) rev'd, 249 U.S. 86
(1919); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1919) 95 (White, C.J., dissenting).
61 See 268 U.S. 5, 22-23 (1925).
62 Id. at 17.
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that could as easily have come from opinions in the Raich63 or Oregon64
cases, McReynolds observed that "[o]bviously, direct control of medical
practice . .. is beyond the power of the federal government." 65 Like
Holmes writing in Jin Fuey Moy, McReynolds next invoked "the familiar
rule that 'a statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid,
not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts
upon that score."' 66 Accordingly, McReynolds "strictly construed" the
Harrison Act 67 and found it inapplicable to the circumstances before the
Court, which were deemed within "the limits of that professional conduct
with which Congress never intended to interfere. 68
A year later in United States v. Daugherty, Justice McReynolds
once again delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 69 In Daugherty
the Court upheld a fifteen-year prison sentence, which, the Court noted,
"seem[ed] extremely harsh."'70 Nevertheless, McReynolds also outlined
an argument in favor of overruling Doremus, a case from which he had
dissented:
The constitutionality of the [Harrison] Anti-Narcotic
Act, touching which this court so sharply divided in
United States v. Doremus, was not raised below, and has
not been again considered. The doctrine approved in
Hammer v. Dagenhart, Child Labor Tax Case, . . . and
Linder v. United States may necessitate a review of that
question, if hereafter properly presented.7 '
Having gone out of his way to signal the Court's willingness to recon-
sider the holding of Doremus, McReynolds proved unable to carry that
project through to fruition. Just over a year after Daugherty, McReyn-
olds wrote the Court's opinion in Alston v. United States, which rebuffed
a federalism challenge to the Harrison Act.72 But that was not necessa-
rily the end of the matter. In rejecting Alston's constitutional claim, Mc-
Reynolds stressed that "[t]he present cause arises under those provisions
63 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
64 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
65 Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
66 Id. at 17-18.
67 Id. at 19.
68 Id. at 22-23; cf Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597-605 (1926) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition of intoxicating liquors "for
beverage purposes" did not empower Congress to establish the maximum amount of liquor a
physician could lawfully prescribe, and that such legislation constituted an impermissible in-
trusion into the reserved powers of the states to control the practice of medicine within their
borders).
69 269 U.S. 360 (1926).
70 Id. at 364.
71 Id. at 362-63 (citations omitted).
72 274 U.S. 289, 294 (1927).
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of [Harrison Act] section 1 which impose a stamp tax on certain drugs
and declare it unlawful to purchase or sell them except in or from origi-
nal stamped packages. ' 73 These provisions were the most impervious to
constitutional attack because they "d[id] not absolutely prohibit buying
or selling ... [and] ha[d] produced substantial revenue. '74 Accordingly,
McReynolds had no difficulty sustaining these provisions of the Act,
which were "clearly within the power of Congress to lay taxes and ha[d]
no necessary connection with any requirement of the act which may be
subject to reasonable disputation.'75 Thus, while he forcefully rejected
one constitutional challenge, he also alluded to and kept alive another.
The only consequence of his doing so, however, was to defer for
another year the Court's conclusive reaffirmation of Doremus, which fi-
nally came in Nigro v. United States.76 Frank Nigro had been indicted
and convicted for selling an ounce of morphine without compelling the
purchaser to submit an order for the drug on a government form as sec-
tion 2 of the Harrison Act arguably required.77 Chief Justice Taft's opin-
ion for the Court first embraced the government's broad interpretation of
section 2, requiring that all narcotics purchasers either have registered as
dealers under section 1 of the Act or have in hand a qualifying physi-
cian's prescription for the drug purchased. 78 As the three dissenters-
Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler-argued, section 2 might
have been read to require only that the seller, whom section 1 indepen-
dently obliged to register, have previously obtained and used the govern-
ment's order forms. 79 But Taft stressed the literal language of section 2,
which by its terms applied to "any person." 80 As construed by the Court,
the Act in effect criminalized receipt of the covered narcotics for non-
medicinal purposes. So interpreted, it constituted a spurious use of the
taxing power to prohibit private conduct deemed dangerous and im-
moral-a responsibility not entrusted by the Constitution's enumerated
powers to the federal government, but rather, one reserved to the states.
In form, at least, Chief Justice Taft agreed that the federal govern-
ment lacked any such power. Early in his analysis, he rather righteously
avowed that:
In interpreting the act, we must assume that it is a taxing
measure, for otherwise it would be no law at all. If it is a
73 Id. at 294.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
76 276 U.S. 332 (1928). That decision addressed and resolved a series of questions that
the Eighth Circuit had, in a now-extinct procedure, certified for Supreme Court consideration.
77 See id. at 337-38.
78 See id. at 344.
79 See id. at 355-58.
80 See id. at 334.
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mere act for the purpose of regulating and restraining the
purchase of the opiate and other drugs, it is beyond the
power of Congress, and must be regarded as invalid, just
as the Child Labor Act of Congress was held to be, in
Bailey, Collector, v. Drexel Furniture Co.8 1
Taft continued, "Everything in the construction of section 2 must be re-
garded as directed toward the collection of the taxes imposed in section 1
and the prevention of evasion by persons subject to the tax." 82 Other-
wise, section 2 of the Act could not be sustained. 83 Taft nevertheless
upheld section 2 (as broadly construed by the government) on the trans-
parent fiction that its strict constraints on both those who might sell and
those who might buy narcotics were merely incidental to tax collection. 84
Taft reasoned that the section's requirement that purchasers also be regis-
tered (unless they held a valid physician's prescription) relieved the reve-
nue service of a significant enforcement burden-namely, the need to
examine the list of registered sellers to determine whether a particular
seller's name appeared thereon. 85 But this imagined administrative con-
venience was eclipsed by the prohibitory effect of such a broad construc-
tion of the Act. Because would-be non-medicinal users were not even
permitted to register, they could never obtain the forms necessary to
make a purchase. 86 It would be as though Congress prohibited the sale
of alcoholic beverages in order to ensure that distributors paid the excise
tax on alcohol sales. Taft justified congressional elimination of the non-
medicinal narcotics market as a means of ensuring that the distributors in
that market paid their taxes. 87 The surgery succeeded but only by killing
the patient.
To his credit, Justice McReynolds-himself no enthusiast for non-
traditional behavior88-emphasized these points in his dissenting opin-
81 Id. at 341 (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922)).
82 Id. at 341-42.
83 See id. at 342.
84 See id. at 353-54.
85 Id. at 345. Chief Justice Taft also noted that, in the years intervening between the
events at issue in Doremus and those with which the instant case was concerned, Congress had
amended the Act to increase the tax and the revenue produced thereby. Id. at 353. See Robert
C. Brown, When is a Tax not a Tax?, 11 IND. L.J. 399, 421-22 (1936), for an argument that
because this intervening amendment augmented the revenue raised under the Act, the amend-
ment supplied the foundation for constitutionality woefully lacking in Doremus.
86 See Harold Gill Reuschlein & Albert B. Spector, Taxing and Spending: The Loaded
Dice of a Federal Economy, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 20-21 (1937) (discussing the practical effect
of the Harrison Act).
87 See Nigro, 276 U.S. at 345-47.
88 McReynolds was no enthusiast for non-traditional behavior. Cf Nigro, 276 U.S. at
357 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the "evils incident to the use of opium").
See JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES CLARK McREYNOLDS
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ion, which Justice Sutherland joined. 89 He first exposed the necessary
effect of the Court's interpretation of section 2, observing that "[a]s con-
strued by the United States, the statute prohibits all sales except to those
who are registered or hold physicians' prescriptions-no others can buy
lawfully." 90 After noting that even the majority deemed the Act sustain-
able "only as a revenue measure," McReynolds rejected as an artifice the
claim that "Congress could have supposed that collection of the pre-
scribed tax would be materially aided by requiring" purchasers to use an
order form that they could not lawfully obtain. 91 "[I]nhibition of sales
ha[d] no just relation to the collection of the tax laid on dealers[,]" and
any "suggestion to the contrary [was] fanciful."'92 Indeed, "the real and
primary purpose [of section 2 as construed by the government was] not
difficult to discover."'93 Congress's "plain intent [was] to control the
traffic within the States by preventing sales except to registered persons
and holders of prescriptions, and this amount[ed] to an attempted regula-
tion of something reserved to the States."' 94 The concluding passage of
McReynolds dissent, which laid bare the fallacy essential to the major-
ity's analysis, merits quotation at some length:
The habit of smoking tobacco is often deleterious. Many
think it ought to be suppressed. The craving for
diamonds leads to extravagance, and frequently to crime.
Silks are luxuries, and their use abridges the demand for
cotton and wool. Those who sell tobacco, or diamonds,
or silks may be taxed by the United States. But, surely,
a provision in an act laying such a tax which limited
sales of cigars, cigarettes, jewels, or silks to some small
class alone authorized to secure official blanks would
not be proper or necessary in order to enforce collection.
The acceptance of such a doctrine would bring many
purely local matters within the potential control of the
federal government. The admitted evils incident to the
use of opium cannot justify disregard of the powers "re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people." 95
124-26, 136 (1992), for a discussion of McReynolds's antipathy for unorthodox persons and
conduct.
89 See Nigro, 276 U.S. at 354-57. Justice Butler dissented on the ground that he would
have rejected the government's broad construction of the Act's section 2 and, thereby, avoided
the constitutional question. Id. at 358 (Butler, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 356 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 357 (quoting U.S. CONST., amend. X).
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The clarity and force of McReynolds's analysis in this dissent demon-
strates that the majority Justices were on notice as to the likely conse-
quences of sustaining a broad interpretation of the Harrison Act but did
so regardless. Even harder to justify, however, is the Raich Court's dis-
regard of Justice Thomas's similar counsels decades after intervening
events had proven McReynolds prophetic.96
B. EARLY FEDERAL REGULATION OF OTHER "MORAL VICES"
After much ado about federalism, the Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the Harrison Act, despite the transparency of Congress's ille-
gitimate purpose: to exercise a core aspect of the police power-
sheltering the weak-willed from the temptation of vice. The Harrison
Act cases are a subset of a larger class of early twentieth-century rulings
rejecting constitutional challenges to federal morals regulations. The
majority of the Justices, perhaps inclined by their own moral sensibilities
to sustain what they perceived to be beneficial safeguards against vice,97
acceded to expanding constructions of Congress's enumerated powers,
especially its authority over interstate commerce.
A seminal ruling came in Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), in
which a bare majority of the Justices sustained an 1895 federal statute
enacted "for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic through National and In-
terstate Commerce. ' 98 Chief Justice Fuller, joined by three other jus-
tices, dissented from this holding in an opinion that was both forceful
and foreboding. In prohibiting the interstate shipment of lottery tickets,
Fuller objected, Congress had in effect asserted a power to regulate pub-
lic morality by leveraging its control over the channels of interstate com-
merce.99 Fuller warned that "the necessary consequence" of the
majority's recognition of a virtually unlimited congressional power to
regulate interstate transportation was "to take from the States all jurisdic-
tion over [any] subject so far as interstate communication is con-
cerned." 100 The majority's endorsement of this broad understanding of
the commerce power constituted "a long step in the direction of wiping
out all traces of state lines, and the creation of a centralized Govern-
96 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
97 Cf Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Apply-
ing First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control
Over Social Issues, 85 IowA L. REv. 1, 78 (1999) ("The Justices' laissez-faire economic phi-
losophy led them to strike down progressive regulations in areas like production and employ-
ment, yet their moral puritanism resulted in sustaining legislation that prohibited illicit sex,
lotteries, and other vices.") (citation omitted).
98 Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 364 (1903).
99 Id. at 365 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 371. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE FULLER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS,
AND LEGACY (ABC-CLIO 2003), for a recent overview of the Fuller Court.
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ment."10' 1 Indeed, Fuller concluded his dissenting opinion by noting that
"[o]ur form of government may remain notwithstanding legislation or
decision, but, as long ago observed, it is with governments, as with reli-
gions, the form may survive the substance of the faith."' 10 2
As Chief Justice Fuller had feared, The Lottery Case supplied prece-
dent for numerous federal statutes selectively forbidding interstate trans-
port in an attempt to suppress goods and conduct deemed dangerous to
public health or morals. For example, the Court thereafter upheld federal
statutes imposing prohibitive taxation on the sale of artificially colored
oleomargarine 10 3 and criminalizing interstate transport of "adulterated ar-
ticles of food or drugs." 10 4 Extending The Lottery Case's recognition of
Congress's power to forbid interstate transport for the purpose of sup-
pressing temptations to moral vice, the Court upheld a 1910 statute
"commonly known as the white slave act." 10 5 That federal statute made
it a felony to transport any woman or girl-or to persuade, induce, or
entice any woman or girl to go-from one state to another "for the pur-
pose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose."' 10 6
Justice McKenna, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that:
[S]urely if the facility of interstate transportation can be
taken away from the demoralization of lotteries .... the
contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of
food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from
the systematic enticement to and enslavement in prosti-
tution and debauchery of women, and, more insistently,
of girls. 10 7
101 The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 365 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 375. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTIrruION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LiBERTY 306-12 (2004) (discussing whether the power "to regulate"
within the meaning of the Commerce Clause should be construed to include the power "to
prohibit"); Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization
of American Corporation Law, 1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. REv. 304 (1979) (providing a water-
shed reevaluation of the historical context and significance of the E.C. Knight case).
103 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 64 (1904). The tax was relatively transparent
protectionism shielding the butter industry from competition, justified by undocumented
claims that artificially colored oleomargarine somehow endangered public health, or at the
least engendered consumer confusion. See generally Geoffrey Miller, Public Choice at the
Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 83
(1989), for a deliciously ironic history of "the first battle in the margarine war," which
culminated in the passage of 1886 Act ultimately challenged in McCray.
104 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 60 (1911).
105 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 317, 323 (1913).
106 Id. at 317-18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
107 Id. at 322. Indeed, the Court seemed to embrace without reservation the broadest
implications of The Lottery Case. Justice McKenna observed that:
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and Nation having different
spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said, but it must be kept in mind that we are one
people; and the powers reserved to the States and those conferred on the Nation are
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The full import of Hoke quickly revealed itself in a series of cases
that continued to expand Congress's power to regulate interstate com-
merce. First, the Court, over Justice McKenna's dissent on non-constitu-
tional grounds, affirmed the felony convictions of two men under the
same statute, for traveling from California to Nevada in the company of
their voluntary mistresses. 0 8 Caminetti made fornication and adultery
federal crimes so long as the prosecution established the minimal re-
quirement of an interstate nexus. 1°9 Two years later, the Court upheld
the War-Time Prohibition Act, a federal statute (enacted prior to the rati-
fication of the Eighteenth Amendment) that prohibited the sale of dis-
tilled spirits for beverage purposes.110 The Court advanced still another
adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the gen-
eral welfare, material and moral. [Id.]
Nor did the Court recoil from the apparent consequence that Congress could employ its author-
ity over interstate commerce to exercise a general police power over the entire nation: "Con-
gress has power over transportation 'among the several states;' that the power is complete in
itself[;] and that Congress, as an incident to it, may adopt not only means necessary but conve-
nient to its exercise[;] and the means may have the quality of police regulations." Id. at 323
(emphasis added).
108 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 482-83, 496 (1917).
109 A few days before, invoking Hoke and The Lottery Case, Chief Justice White's opin-
ion for the Court had observed, albeit in dicta, that Congress had the power to prohibit all
shipment or transport of intoxicating beverages "in the channels of interstate commerce."
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1917). The Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to the Webb-Kenyon Act, which prohibited shipment of
intoxicating liquors into a state only if the shipment violated state law. Id. at 332. A few
weeks after the decision in Clark Distilling Co., Congress enacted the Reed Amendment,
which further extended the federal prohibition on interstate transport of alcohol. The Court
later upheld the federal criminal prosecution of one who carried a single quart of liquor from
Kentucky into West Virginia for personal use, even though West Virginia law permitted the
conduct. United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 421-22, 427 (1919). Justice McReynolds dis-
sented, claiming "the Reed Amendment in no proper sense regulates interstate commerce, but
is a direct intermeddling with the state's internal affairs." Id. at 428.
110 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 153, 168 (1919)
(sustaining the Act as incidental to Congress's war powers). After acknowledging that "the
United States lacks the police power, and that this was reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment," Justice Brandeis's opinion for a unanimous Court continued:
[I]t is nonetheless true that when the United States exerts any of the powers con-
ferred upon it by the Constitution, no valid objection can be based upon the fact that
such exercise may be attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise by a
State of its police power, or that it may tend to accomplish a similar purpose. [Id. at
156.]
Less than a month later Justice McReynolds, writing for himself and Justices Day and Van
Devanter, tried in vain to limit the damage Hamilton had done to the states' reserved powers.
Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, (1920) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Dissenting from the
Court's decision upholding as a war measure prohibition of near beer so weak as to be nonin-
toxicating, Justice McReynolds argued that the connection between watered-down beer and
U.S. military necessities circa autumn 1919 was so attenuated as to expose Congress's asser-
tion of its war powers as a mere pretext for an invasion of the police power of the states. Id. at
310. Having gone along with Court in Hamilton, though, Justice McReynolds and his fellow
dissenters seemed to be unduly concerned about closing the barn door after the horse had
escaped.
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substantial step in 1925, when it affirmed a criminal conviction under a
federal statute that prohibited the transport of stolen motor vehicles
across state lines."' Chief Justice Taft's opinion for a unanimous Court
in Brooks expressly condoned a congressional police power over inter-
state commerce:
Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to
the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such
commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishon-
esty or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of
other States from the State of origin. In doing this it is
merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the
public, within the field of interstate commerce.1 12
The Brooks opinion was the first to concede this much so frankly, but
this concession flowed ineluctably from The Lottery Case and its numer-
ous progeny. In those decisions, the Court had invariably rejected the
argument that Congress's selective prohibition of interstate transport had
unconstitutionally invaded the powers reserved by the Tenth
Amendment. 113
Yet in Hammer v. Dagenhart, a bare five-Justice majority embraced
this very argument, which they had previously rebuffed in the context of
traditional morals regulation, as the ground for invalidating a federal stat-
ute prohibiting interstate transportation of goods produced by child la-
bor. 114 This statute made it unlawful for a "producer, manufacturer, or
dealer [to] ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce
any article or commodity the product of any ... manufacturing establish-
ment," which had in the previous thirty days employed children under
the age of fourteen, or employed beyond set hours children between the
ages of fourteen and sixteen. 15 Justice Day's opinion for the Court ar-
gued that "[t]he act in its effect [did] not regulate transportation among
the states, but aim[ed] to standardize the ages at which children may be
employed in mining and manufacturing within the states."' 16 Were the
Court to uphold the statute, "all manufacture intended for interstate ship-
ment would be brought under federal control to the practical exclusion of
the authority of the States," thereby destroying "the local power always
''I Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 441 (1925).
112 Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
113 See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 357-58 (1903).
114 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918).
115 Id. at 268-69 (quoting the first section of the challenged federal statute, which also
forbade employment of children 14-16 years old beyond certain hours).
116 Id. at 271-72 (emphasis added).
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existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution."'1 17
Justice Day sought to square the Court's sudden solicitude for the
states' reserved powers with the long line of decisions commencing with
The Lottery Case, which had repeatedly upheld federal legislation that
"in effect" accomplished police power objectives.118 Rather feebly, Jus-
tice Day distinguished this contrary line of authority on the ground that
"[i]n each of [these instances] the use of interstate commerce was neces-
sary to the accomplishment of harmful results," whereas by the time the
products of child labor were ready for interstate shipment, "the labor of
their production [was] over" and any harm to the laborers already com-
plete.11 9 Holmes writing for himself and the other three dissenters coun-
tered, in his justly celebrated opinion, that "[i]t does not matter whether
the supposed evil precedes or follows transportation. It is enough that in
the opinion of Congress the transportation encourages the evil."'120 In-
deed, Chief Justice Taft had held exactly that for a unanimous court in
Brooks, finding it sufficient that a federal prohibition on interstate trans-
port of stolen cars suppressed theft of automobiles in the states from
which they were taken. 12 1 As Professor David Currie wrote of the Ham-
mer decision: "It is hard to believe that the majority found its own dis-
tinctions persuasive."'12 2
117 Id. at 272, 274. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 254-61 (1996), for a discussion of the constitutional
amendment proposed in response to the Court's decision in Hammer.
118 Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1925).
119 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271-72 (1918).
120 Id. at 279-81.
121 Brooks, 267 U.S. at 438-39; see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 176 (1990) (observing that Chief
Justice Taft's opinion for the Court in Brooks "made no effort to show that stolen cars were
harmful to anyone in the state to which they were transported . . . [and] thus left Hammer
dangling without visible support and exposed the Court to a serious charge of inconsistency").
Professor Currie attempted to reconcile Hammer with Brooks on the ground that the federal
statute affirmed in Brooks reinforced rather than supplanted state policy (apparently on the
reasonable assumption that all states criminalized car theft whereas at least some permitted the
child labor effectively proscribed by the statute struck down in Hammer). Id. Though this
argument might square the two rulings considered in isolation, it ignores that by the time
Brooks was decided the Court had, over Justice McReynolds's passionate dissent, already up-
held a federal criminal prosecution under a statute forbidding transport of even a small amount
of liquor for personal consumption into a state that by law permitted the same. Hill, 248 U.S.
420, 421-22, 427 (1919). Thus, the Court did not in fact make conformity with state law a
predicate to the exercise of the federal police power acknowledged in Brooks (and repudiated
in Hammer).
122 CURRIE, supra note 121, at 98. The distinguished Professor Corwin was even more
hostile to Hammer. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES
RIGHTS: BACK TO THE CONSTITUTION 254-55 (1936). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Proper
Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1427 (1987), for an assessment far more
charitable to the Hammer majority.
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It was as though, after years of thoughtless neglect, the Court in
1918 finally awoke too late to the realization of its duty to safeguard the
states' reserved powers. Ultimately, it was Justice Holmes who, in his
inimitable fashion, most eloquently summarized the clash between Ham-
mer and the Court's prior decisions upholding federal morals regulations:
The notion that prohibition is any less prohibition
when applied to things now thought evil I do not under-
stand. But if there is any matter upon which civilized
countries have agreed-far more unanimously than they
have with regard to intoxicants and some other matters
over which this country is now emotionally aroused-it
is the evil of premature and excessive child labor. I
should have thought that if we were to introduce our
moral conceptions where in my opinion they do not be-
long, this was preeminently a case for upholding the ex-
ercise of all its powers by the United States.
But I had thought that the propriety of the exercise
of a power admitted to exist in some cases was for the
consideration of Congress alone and that this Court al-
ways had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment
upon the questions of policy or morals. It is not for this
Court to pronounce when the prohibition is necessary to
regulation if it ever may be necessary-to say that it is
permissible to as against strong drink but not as against
the product of ruined lives.123
Of course, to say that Hammer could not be reconciled with the Court's
prior rulings is not to say that Hammer was wrongly decided for the error
may have been made in some, if not all, of the cases before. Regardless,
the manifest tension between Hammer and its progeny, on the one hand,
and the Court's numerous decisions affirming broad assertions of con-
123 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 280 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Curiously, when the Court struck
down the federal child labor tax as an impermissible end run around Hammer, Justices Holmes
and Brandeis silently joined the majority opinion. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child
Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922). Whether their acquiescence reflected their perception
that Congress's power to tax was more liable to abuse, and thus more appropriately subjected
to probing judicial scrutiny, as some have wondered, see CURRIE, supra note 121, at 174, or
whether they simply threw in the proverbial towel remains, for the present author at least, a
mystery. For discussion of the Tenth Amendment aspects of these cases, see Jay S. Bybee,
The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: On Reading The Constitution in Plato's Cave, 23
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 555 (2000); David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the
Supreme Court's Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 339 (1996); Wil-
liam Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769 (1987). See generally THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (Mark R. Kil-
lenbeck ed., 2002).
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gressional authority, on the other, seriously undercut the Court's avowed
dedication to the preservation of a robust federalism.1 24
C. CONTEMPORANEOUS COMMENTARY
The Court's fidelity to principle, or lack thereof, was as vigorously
debated off the Court as on it. Anticipating the Court's invalidation of
the federal child labor act, Frederick Green, a law professor at the Uni-
versity of Illinois, published an article in 1917 arguing that the statute
exceeded Congress's enumerated powers. 2 5 Like Justice Day's opinion
for the Court in Hammer, Professor Green made out a creditable case in
chief, stressing that little would be left of the states' reserved powers
were Congress permitted to condition access to interstate markets on
compliance with a congressional code of conduct.' 26 His reasoning
foundered, though, upon the shoals of precedent, because, as we have
seen, the Court had sustained numerous federal morals regulations that
operated in just such a fashion. Green's efforts to distinguish these cases
exposed his own unconscious, but nevertheless decisive, prejudice on the
merits of the underlying social and economic policy more clearly than
any rebuttal ever could have. The prior cases were different, he argued,
because interstate lottery tickets, liquor, prostitutes, or even willing adul-
terers were all things intrinsically dangerous or immoral, whereas ex-
ploitation of child labor was beyond reproach: "to employ children of 13
in factories or of 15 in quarries or mines ... [was] not immoral."1 27 To
the contrary, "[an employer of child labor [was] ...fully within his
legal rights, and his moral rights as well."'1 8 Green presaged Holmes's
poignant juxtaposition of "strong drink" with "the product of ruined
lives," only without any sense of irony.129 By all appearances, he also
124 Compare, e.g., The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922), with, e.g., Brooks v.
United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925). For an exhaustive and illuminating account of the Taft
Court's federalism jurisprudence, in all its manifestations, see Robert Post, Federalism in the
Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1569 (2002) ("The question is why
the Taft Court so forcefully sought to maintain this distinction [between commerce and manu-
facturing] in the context of child labor regulation, when it was unraveling analogous distinc-
tions in the context of railroad rates, stockyards, and boards of trade.").
125 See Frederick Green, The Child Labor Law and the Constitution, 2 ILL. L. BULL. 3
(1917).
126 See id. at 20. Green also anticipated congressional resort to prohibitory taxation of
child labor's outputs. Tellingly, he summarized his position in this context by asserting that
"the power to lay and collect taxes does not include power to require payment from one who
does a named act, if the price is pitched so high, that it is plain there will be nothing to collect,
or not enough to make the law operate as a raising of revenue from a contributing class." Id. at
25. While it is hard to argue against such a common-sense approach, it must be observed that
such a standard would have required invalidation of the Harrison Act as well.
127 Id. at 5-6.
128 Id. at 6.
129 Compare Hamer v. Dagenhart, 247 US 251, 280 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting), with
Green, supra note 125.
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lacked any awareness that child labor might, to many, be a moral issue at
least as compelling lotteries and marital infidelity. Most importantly, he
failed to discern that it was for Congress, and not for the Court, to deter-
mine what would be deemed good or evil for these purposes. In fulfil-
ling the prophecy of Green's article in the ensuing Supreme Court term,
the Hammer majority fell victim to a similar blindness.
Not surprisingly Hammer spurred numerous law journal articles.
Many commentators savaged the majority on the ground that the ruling
was glaringly inconsistent with the long line of decisions sustaining con-
gressional regulations of perceived moral vices.1 30 A few others strug-
gled mightily, and at times outlandishly, to discover some unarticulated
principle that would reconcile all the decisions.1 3' Commentators were
nearly unanimous, however, in the conclusion that Justice Day's opinion
for the Court failed in its effort to square Hammer with these prior
rulings.
Robert Cushman, at the time a colleague of Green's at the Univer-
sity of Illinois, stressed the cases' apparent disarray, and the consequent
confusion and impatience of the "man in the street" who had come to
believe that "Congress has, or ought to have, authority to pass any salu-
tary law in the interest of the national welfare."' 132 Nor would reciting
that Congress "may pass laws to suppress the white slave traffic or the
sale of adulterated food, [but] has no power to prohibit child labor...
add much to his understanding of American constitutional law." 133
Rather "[t]oo often it merely decreases his respect for the constitution
and the courts which construe it.' 34 Cushman lamented that "Congress
has come gradually to legislate in affairs over which it has been supposed
to have no jurisdiction-to assume responsibility for the safety, health,
morals, good order, and general welfare of the nation, and thus to exer-
cise what may be called a national police power." 135 Nor, Cushman rea-
soned, had the Court in Hammer imposed any meaningful check on
Congress, which "still retain[ed] full authority.., to protect the national
130 See, e.g., Thurlow M. Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case, 32 HARV. L. REV. 45
(1918); Thomas Reed Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the Com-
merce Clause, 3 S. L.Q. 175 (1918).
131 See, e.g., Note, The Feasibility of State Control as a Test of the Scope of the Federal
"Police Power," 29 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1929) [hereinafter Feasibility of State Control];
F.D.G. Ribble, The "Current of Commerce": A Note on the Commerce Clause and the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act, 18 MINN. L. REv. 296 (1934) [hereinafter Feasibility of State
Control]; Robert L. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 47 HARv.
L. REV. 1335 (1934).
132 Robert E. Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REv. 289, 289 (1919).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 289-90.
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health, morals safety, and general welfare from such evils as depend
upon the physical agency of interstate commerce facilities."'136
Whereas Cushman's commentary affected a philosophical tone,
other critics were more direct. Writing in the Harvard Law Review,
prominent New York attorney and former Assistant Attorney General,
Thurlow M. Gordon, excoriated the Court's inconstancy. He echoed
Holmes, observing that "[t]ransportation of child-made goods encourages
the ruin of the lives of future citizens in the state of production."1 37 Al-
luding to the Mann Act cases, he continued: interstate transportation "di-
rectly aids this immorality quite as much as the transportation across
state lines of girls for the purpose of prostitution."' 138 Professor William
C. Jones, of the University of California, Berkeley, declared that the
Court could have the result in these and other similar, prior cases or it
could have the result it reached in Hammer, but it could not, with any
consistency, have both. 139 "Either the Lottery, Pure Food, and White
Slave cases have been decided rightly on some large constitutional prin-
ciple, or they have been decided wrongly, on no constitutional principle
at all, but simply in response to a popular emotion."'140 The Court's ef-
forts to distinguish these cases in Hammer, however, were "utterly
indefensible."'14'
Thomas Reed Powell, then a Professor of Constitutional Law at Co-
lumbia University, would prove to be among "the Court's most acerbic
and effective critics."'142 By the time the Court decided Hammer, it was
far too late, he insisted, to deny Congress the use of its power over inter-
state commerce as a means to affect primary conduct it might lack the
power to govern directly.' 43 Citing the Court's lottery, liquor, and Mann
Act decisions, Powell declared that similar uses of Congress's Com-
merce Clause authority had been reaffirmed myriad times over several
decades.' 44 Once one "brush[ed] aside all the confused and erroneous
thinking of the majority, . . . only their fiat" remained to account for the
Court's failure to follow these precedents and sustain the Child Labor
Act.' 45 "[C]ertainly nothing in the Constitution [ ] require[d] the deci-
136 Robert Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REV. 452, 482-83 (1919).
137 Gordon, supra note 130, at 55.
138 Id.
139 William Carey Jones, The Child Labor Decision, 6 CAL. L. REV. 395 (1918).
140 Id. at 410.
141 Id.
142 Alexander M. Bickel, The Fate of Social Legislation, 1914-21: Federal, in IX THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
414, 458 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1984).
143 Powell, supra note 130, at 195.
144 Id. at 195-98.
145 Id. at 198.
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sion of the majority," which was "wretchedly supported by the argument
of the opinion."i' 46 These particulars, joined with "the narrow margin by
which the decision was reached," invited "the inference that the judges
who composed the majority were influenced by their personal predilec-
tions on a question of policy.1 47 Powell ultimately concluded that "[t]he
Child Labor decision illustrates anew the extent to which the judges of
the Supreme Court are our governors. It shows that the predilections of a
single judge may nullify the predilections of a majority of two houses of
the national legislature and the chief executive of the nation."' 48
The decisions sustaining the constitutionality of the Harrison Act
both confirmed and compounded these criticisms. Few, if any, commen-
tators were as credulous as the Court concerning Congress's nominal
characterization of the statute as a tax, as opposed to a direct regulation.
About Doremus, Professor Powell observed that "[t]his decision had
been reached only by a five-to-four vote, and the judgment of reasona-
bleness on which it was predicated [was] of course rationally indefen-
sible."' 149 In reality, "[tihe court allowed Congress to abuse its taxing
power for a worthy end."'150 Joseph Long, a professor at Washington and
Lee University, had no greater difficulty seeing through the forms of the
Harrison Act. "By this act, under the guise of an excise law," he re-
marked, "Congress undertook to regulate the sale of narcotic drugs
throughout the United States."' 5' But the Supreme Court capitulated to
this fiction. In words that foreshadowed the Raich and Oregon contro-
146 Id. at 199.
147 Id. at 202.
148 Id. at 200.
149 Thomas Reed Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution, 1 N.C. L. REv.
61, 80 (1922).
150 Id.; see also THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARITIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 87 (1956) (describing the cases sustaining the Harrison Act as "[h]ardly can-
did"). Professor Powell nevertheless found the Harrison Act to be 'distinguishable from the
child labor [tax] law, in that its regulatory features were not the basis of taxability." Powell,
supra note 149, at 80. This claim, however, appears to be predicated on a misreading of the
Harrison Act. Powell explained that, as he read it:
The device of the Harrison Act is a clever one for securing the publicity of transac-
tions so that the states may be aided in the execution of their police powers. It does
not in and of itself enable the federal government to suppress unworthy conduct as
would the artifice attempted in the child labor tax. [Id.]
However, as actually implemented, the Harrison Act did prohibit private sale, purchase, or use
of narcotics absent a physician's prescription, regardless of the treatment relevant state crimi-
nal law accorded that conduct. See Reuschlein & Spector, supra note 86, at 21 (concluding
that the Harrison Act did "not merely [give] publicity to criminal transactions but rather af-
ford[ed] an effective method for complete control of the drug traffic," and noting that the
"Federal Government has been the prosecutor, not the several states").
151 Joseph R. Long, Federal Police Regulation by Taxation, 9 VA. L. REv. 81, 88 (1922).
Cf THOMAS JAMES NORTON, LOSING LIBERTY JUDICIALLY 212 (1928) (noting that the Harrison
Act, though "in the guise of a revenue measure," was "[i]n practice.., a very detailed regula-
tion of sales [of narcotics] in the States").
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versies, Professor Long explained that "[t]hus the regulation of the drug
business and the practice of medicine [was] largely brought within the
federal jurisdiction."'152
What made this judicial abdication all the more troubling was its
selectivity. Throughout, the Court persistently invoked federalism to an-
nul those few congressional acts five or more of the Justices, for un-
known reasons, found singularly contemptible. Contrasting the Court's
decisions sustaining the Harrison Act and other regulations cloaked in
tax garb with the Court's invalidation of the so-called Child Labor Tax,
Professor Cushman pronounced the two lines of precedent "logically ir-
reconcilable" and chastised the Court for preserving "two available judi-
cial techniques for dealing with the validity of national police regulations
under the taxing power." 153 The Court's choice of technique dictated the
result in a particular case. The unbridled "discretion which the Court
enjoy[ed] in determining which of the two doctrines [to] apply" in any
given case secured it "a strategic position with respect to national pol-
icy.' 1 54 If the Court's rulings took "on the aspect of... 'judicial legisla-
tion,'" at least the usurpation had become "familiar" due to "its presence
in so many other parts of our constitutional system."'155
Writing in 1928, Arthur Machen dismissed as empty the Court's
claim in the Child Labor Tax Case that it would invalidate federal stat-
utes attempting "under the guise of taxation to legislate upon matters [the
Tenth Amendment] reserved exclusively to the states."' 56 That obliga-
tion had been honored far more in the breach than in the observance: "No
critic can justly charge the Court with excess of zeal for states rights in
the application of this principle, as witness ... the decision sustaining,
with a blindness worthy of Justitia herself, the obvious constitutional
fraud of the Harrison Drug Act." 157 A 1936 article in the Georgetown
Law Journal proclaimed that "[t]he Doremus case represents, to this
152 Long, supra note 151, at 89.
153 Robert E. Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation, 18
MINN. L. REV. 759, 782-83 (1934).
154 Id. at 783.
155 Id.
156 Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Strange Case of Florida v. Mellon, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 351,
375 (1928).
157 Id. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added); see also S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Uncon-
stitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26 MICH. L. REV. 176, 184 n.29 (1927) ("The federal
government has no general police power but it is well known that police ends have been
accomplished by the enactment of legislation under its enumerated powers.") (citing Doremus,
249 U.S. 86 (1919)); Malcolm P. Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication-A Study
of Modified and Overruled Decisions, 46 HARV. L. REV. 593, 611 (1933) ("A second decision
[Nigro] upholding our extensive system of federal narcotic taxations, prohibiting sales of nar-
cotics except by registered persons" has "recently again raised questions in some minds
whether the limits set for child labor legislation by Congress have been consistently observed
in other decisions of the Court.").
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date, the extremity of regulation under the guise of the revenue
power." 158
A year later, Thomas Cowan, a law professor at Louisiana State
University who had previously served as an attorney in the Department
of Justice, ridiculed Chief Justice Taft's opinions for the Court in the
Child Labor Tax and Nigro cases.1 59 In the former, "[t]he Doremus case
was distinguished by a piece of judicial legerdemain."' 60 As to the latter,
Cowan observed even more colorfully that "with judicial seriousness that
would make a cat laugh the learned Chief Justice solemnly found that the
elaborate restrictive measures of the Anti-Narcotic Act and the extremely
severe penalties were" incidental and instrumental to the collection of the
relatively tiny tax.1 61 Cowan continued:
The Chief Justice [ ] gravely found that Section 9 [of the
Harrison Act], which subjects anyone failing to comply
with the requirements of the act to a fine of not more
than $2,000 or imprisonment for not more than five
years or both, was designed to prevent evasion of six
dollars per annum on retail dealers in narcotics, and a
stamp tax of one cent per ounce on packages of narcotics
sold. 162
Plainly only willful blindness could reconcile the two cases according to
any policy-neutral legal principle. For Cowan, there was no escaping the
conclusion that the Supreme Court "is a policy-forming body," that the
"[i]nfluences brought to bear on it resemble those used on legislators,"
and that "consideration of the desirability of legislation must be upper-
most in the minds of the judges when they decide" cases avowedly dic-
tated by principles of federalism. 163
158 Charles V. Koons, Growth of Federal Licensing, 24 GEo. L.J. 293, 303 (1935-1936);
see also Brown, supra note 85, at 420 (describing the Harrison Act as "a law designed to
prohibit the sale of narcotics, except for proper medicinal purposes"); Thomas A. Cowan, The
Social Security Act and Free Judicial Choice, 9 Miss. L.J. 407, 419 (1937) (noting that the
"Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act [ ] was aimed at the complete control of trade in narcotics" and
that Doremus constituted "the highwater mark of federal regulation by means of the taxing
power"); George Ross Hull, The Rights of the People of the States, 59 AM. L. REv. 801, 810
(1925) ("In 1914, Congress reached out through the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act to regulate
the sale of narcotics and justified its action by the taxing power."); Thomas I. Parkinson, Child
Labor and the Constitution, 12 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REv. 110, 112 (1922) (noting the transpar-
ently regulatory character of the Harrison Act and, accordingly, the tension between Doremus
and the Child Labor Tax Case).
159 See generally Cowan, supra note 158.
160 Cowan, supra note 158, at 420.
161 Id. at 422.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 425-26. Cowan was not adverse to inclusion of policy considerations in consti-
tutional adjudication. To the contrary, it was his view that "[b]inding precedents in the appli-
cation of constitutional standards would be intolerable." Id. His ultimate point was, rather, that
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Of course some scholars were unwilling to admit as much. Con-
fronted with the constitutional confusion created by the clash between
the child labor cases and the decisions sustaining federal morals regula-
tions, several commentators sought to supply a reconciling principle not
identified by the Court. For example, a student note in the Columbia
Law Review acknowledged that the child labor "decisions [were] un-
doubtedly based far less on the reasons enunciated in the opinions than
on a single underlying policy adverse to federal regulation under any
power," and that "[t]he formulae announced are designed to meet an
emergency without open violence to the precedents." 164 Citing the
Court's reaffirmation of the Harrison Act in Nigro, the author observed
that the rationale of the child labor cases was "already proving unequal to
the strain of later decisions."1 65 In other words, the theory of the Court's
opinions (especially Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the Court in the
Child Labor Tax Case) would have invalidated the Harrison Act as well.
But the author recoiled from the conclusion that the Court's actual hold-
ings were incompatible. Rather, "it [was] time to penetrate deeper and
ascertain the inarticulate major premise that [was] guiding the Supreme
Court to its conclusions."1 66 The "principle tacitly recognized by the
Court" and in fact dictating the seemingly inconsistent results was that
"the federal government may use any of its powers for an ulterior pur-
pose affecting the traditional sphere of state control when and only when
this ulterior purpose is administratively incapable of attainment by state
action."' 67 While this explanation was sensible enough (as is any tautol-
ogy), it reconciled the cases only by assuming the legitimacy and compe-
tence of the Supreme Court to make these kinds of predictive
judgments. 168 Indeed, the Court's critics persuasively argued that the
"much would be gained if the court made its policy-forming function conscious and explicit."
Id. One advantage to this frank course would be a "call for judicial restraint, since judicial
policy makers, or rather policy reviewers, would have to accord to their legislative colleagues
a measure of discretion in the application of the constitutional standard." Id. For this reason,
among others, the federal courts might actually "gain in prestige if they would avowedly be-
come policy reviewers of Congressional action where broad standards of constitutional power
are in question." Id. at 426.
164 See Feasibility of State Control, supra note 131, at 321; see also id. at 323 (observing
that "the Court has actually sustained a large number of federal police measures and invali-
dated only a few"); cf William A. Sutherland, The Child Labor Cases and the Constitution, 8
CORNELL L.Q. 338, 356 (1923) ("We doubt the soundness of the Doremus case, but it must be
admitted that there is a very marked distinction between it and the [Child Labor Tax Case].").
165 Feasibility of State Control, supra note 131, at 321.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 321-22.
168 Cf Feasibility of State Control, supra note 131, at 323 (asserting that "the Court has
shown, almost without exception, a statesmanlike regard for the situation as to the feasibility
of state action to attain the desired end").
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states were, if anything, less able to address the child labor question than
the problems posed by lotteries, alcohol, narcotics, or illicit sex.
But even more forceful was the unanswerable claim, advanced by
the most cogent essayists both on and off the Court, that if American
federalism had been reduced to these kinds of assessments, then they
were more properly made by Congress than by the unelected, unaccount-
able, and uninformed Justices. Their acquiescence in federal morals reg-
ulations had undermined their role in enforcing the enumerated powers
scheme. Their indulgence of the congressional overreaching that they
thought laudable discredited their subsequent efforts to act as apolitical
arbiters. The Justices forfeited the Court's ability to implement the con-
stitutional rules dividing the realm of political engagement into state and
national spheres. Thus impaired by the Supreme Court's decades-long
acquiescence in constitutionally suspect federal morals regulations, fed-
eralism died (the first time) long before most Americans had even heard
of Franklin Roosevelt.
D. THE NEW DEAL ERA
After briefly sketching an overview of the well-worn tale of federal-
ism's demise during the 1930s, this part recounts the lesser-known role
that the Court's decisions sustaining federal morals regulations in gen-
eral, and the Harrison Act more specifically, played in those events.
These decisions impeached the Court's claim to policy neutrality and,
indeed, its professed commitment to federalism. For as we have seen
numerous, prominent critics of the Court repeatedly observed throughout
the 1920s and 30s that a selectively invoked and applied federalism was
not really federalism at all, but rather merely a convenient stalking horse
for judicial imposition of the Justices' unarticulated and unexplained pol-
icy preferences. This part concludes by arguing that this lesson, includ-
ing its consequences for the New Deal Court, is one that the sitting
Justices would be well advised always to remember.
1. During Roosevelt's First Term
If, as others have concluded, the ultimate clash between President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal and the Supreme Court consti-
tuted a "Great Constitutional War," 169 then among the first shots was the
Court's May 6, 1935 decision in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad. Co., which struck down the 1934 Railroad Retirement Act as
beyond Congress's enumerated powers. 170 Justice Owen Roberts wrote
169 MARIAN C. McKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL
WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 (2002); see also Max Lerner, The Great Constitu-
tional War, 18 VA. Q. REv. 530 (1942).
170 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
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the opinion for the Court, in which he was joined only by those aging
Justices who would soon be infamously labeled the "four horsemen."' 7'
This slim majority rejected the argument that the Act, which established
a compulsory retirement and pension regime for all railroad workers,
could be sustained as a measure to promote the safety and efficiency of
interstate transport by rail. Justice Roberts reasoned that, even if Con-
gress could compel the retirement of senior railway laborers, Congress
could not, as a means to that end, impose a pension program on the
industry. If the ends of safety and efficiency in interstate rail transporta-
tion "demand[ed] the elimination of aged employees, their retirement
from the service would suffice to accomplish the object. For these pur-
poses the prescription of a pension for those dropped from service is
wholly irrelevant." 172 To the government's assertion "that it would be
unthinkable to retire a man without pension and [ ] that attempted separa-
tion of retirement and pensions [was] unreal in any practical sense," Jus-
tice Roberts answered that "[t]he supposed impossibility [arose] from a
failure to distinguish constitutional power from social desirability."'' 73
A mere three weeks later in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA).174 In pertinent part, the NIRA authorized the president to ap-
prove, and thereby render legally binding, industry-specific codes of fair
competition. 175 Delivering the opinion of a unanimous Court, Chief Jus-
tice Hughes found that the NIRA exceeded Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce. 176 The NIRA reached business transactions that
were themselves wholly intrastate, even though they had effects on inter-
state commerce.177 Hughes stressed that to serve as a predicate for con-
stitutional exercise of the commerce power such effects had to be
"direct" not "indirect."'178 While "[t]he precise line" between direct and
indirect effects could "be drawn only as individual cases [arose], the dis-
tinction [was] clear in principle."' 179 Moreover, this line was "a funda-
mental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system."' 180
Were the Court to disregard it, "there would be virtually no limit to the
171 See generally Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV.
559 (1997).
172 Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. at 367.
173 Id. at 367. But see POWELL, supra note 150, at 42 (sardonically suggesting Alton R.R.
established that "[iut is a regulation of interstate commerce to help railroads but not to help
railroad employees").
174 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
175 Id. at 522-23.
176 Id. at 542-50,
177 Id.
178 Id. at 546.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 548.
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federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a completely
centralized government." 181
The immediate consequence of Schechter Poultry was a scathing
White House press conference. After comparing the Schechter Poultry
decision to the Court's ignominious ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford,182
President Roosevelt framed the matter in the starkest of terms:
We are facing a very, very great national non-partisan
issue . . . . We have got to decide ... whether in some
way we are going to . . . restore to the Federal Govern-
ment the powers which exist in the national governments
of every nation in the world. 183
Having attacked the Court for relegating the country to what he de-
risively characterized as a "'horse and buggy' definition of interstate
commerce," Roosevelt ominously announced that his Administration
would continue to study the problem in search of an appropriate re-
sponse. 184 Several rulings in the ensuing Supreme Court term exacer-
bated the rift between the Justices and the President.
First came United States v. Butler, which concerned a challenge to
the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA),
another statute enacted in the first one hundred days after FDR's inaugu-
ration and centrally important to his administration's legislative
agenda.185 The plaintiff in Butler attacked the AAA's provisions author-
izing the Secretary of Agriculture to tax processors of selected agricul-
tural commodities in order to raise revenue. 186 The Act in turn permitted
the Secretary to spend the proceeds of those taxes as rental or benefit
payments to those producers who agreed to reduce production in any
given market year. 187 Justice Roberts's muddled and much maligned
opinion for the Court rejected the claim that the challenged provisions
were within Congress's power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes .... to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
181 Id.
182 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
183 McKENNA, supra note 169, at 112 (quoting 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: 1935 205, 215-16 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., Random House
1938)).
184 Id. at 113 (quoting 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT: 1935, at 205, 215-16 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938)); see also WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTrrUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT 90 (1995). Professors McKenna and Leuchtenburg both emphasize that
President Roosevelt's commentary on the Court's May 1935 decisions was not well received,
even by many of his political allies.
185 297 U.S. 1, 73-75 (1936); see McKENNA, supra note 169, at 119-22.
186 Butler, 297 U.S. at I.
187 Id. at 55-56.
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United States."' 88 Justices Stone, Brandies, and Cardozo dissented, 89
and most commentators, both at the time and throughout the intervening
decades, dismissed the ruling in Butler as illogical and result-oriented.190
Ultimately, such vulnerable opinions as the one Roberts wrote for the
Court in Butler contributed in an immeasurable way to the subsequent
demise of the enumerated powers doctrine. 191 Publicly, President
Roosevelt declined to comment on the ruling.192 Privately, however, he
"hardened [his] resolve at some point to meet the constitutional impasse
[between the New Deal and the Supreme Court] head-on." 193 Several
months after Butler, a bare five-Justice majority invalidated yet another
New Deal effort in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.194
The Court's decision in Carter confirmed widely held expectations
by according the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 the same
fate administered a year before to the NIRA in Schechter Poultry. 95 The
Coal Act authorized the creation of coal industry codes that would both
fix prices and govern labor relations. 96 Justice Sutherland, who deliv-
ered an opinion for himself and four other Justices, marshaled a signifi-
cant amount of judicial authority for a previously unestablished
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
189 Justice Brandeis voted to sustain the AAA even though he had previously expressed
his hostility to the Act in private communications with the Administration and its allies in the
legal profession. Accordingly, historian Marian McKenna found "it ...hard to accept the
notion that [Brandeis] voted his conscience in the Butler case." See MCKENNA, supra note
169, at 129-30, 133.
190 For example, the second sentence of Justice Stone's dissenting opinion implied that
the majority's conclusion was the product of some combination of unclear thinking and doubts
about the likely efficacy of the AAA. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 78 (Stone, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Stone observed that "[t]he present stress of widely held and strongly expressed differences
of opinion of the wisdom of the Agricultural Adjustment Act makes it important, in the interest
of clear thinking and sound result, to emphasize at the outset certain propositions which should
have controlling influence in determining the validity of the act." Id. Indeed, the quoted sen-
tence may well have so seriously stung that it provoked Justice Roberts's often ridiculed paean
to policy-neutral or policy-blind judicial review. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 62-63 ("When an act
of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional
mandate, the judicial branch of government has only one duty; to lay the article of the Consti-
tution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter
squares with the former."). Many have attacked these perhaps ill-chosen words as naively
reducing judicial review to an almost mechanistic function. For a more balanced and forgiving
treatment of this passage of Roberts's opinion, see CuRRIm, supra note 121, at 227. See also
McKENNA, supra note 169, at 137-40 (discussing contemporaneous reaction to both the Butler
majority and dissenting opinions and noting that Stone's "was one of the strongest dissents
registered since the Holmes era.").
191 Cf. CURRIE, supra note 121, at 231 ("Justice Roberts ... may well have reached the
right result in striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, but by conceding too much he
made it seem quite untenable; and that boded poorly for the future of the federal system.").
192 McKENNA, supra note 169, at 139.
193 Id. at 142.
194 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
195 Id.
196 See id. at 278.
THE THIRD DEATH OF FEDERALISM
proposition, i.e., that coal mining, like agriculture and manufacturing,
was not itself "commerce" within the meaning of the grant to Con-
gress. 19 7  Eventually, Sutherland arrived at the crux of the dispute,
whether relations between covered employers and their miners had a "di-
rect" effect on interstate commerce. The distinction between direct and
indirect effects on interstate commerce, Sutherland opined, was "not for-
mal, but substantial in the highest degree," a "fundamental" distinction,
"essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system."1 98 To be
sure, the line between the two types of effect was "not always easy to
determine."1 99 But to Sutherland and his colleagues in the majority it
seemed clear that whatever effect labor strife in the coal industry im-
posed on interstate commerce, however great its magnitude, the effect
was merely "secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness of the
effect adds to its importance. It does not alter its character. ' '2° °
It bears emphasis that, with the conclusion that Congress lacked
power over labor relations between coal miners and coal mine operators,
Chief Justice Hughes wholeheartedly concurred.20 1 Indeed, even Justice
Cardozo's dissenting opinion, in which Stone and Brandeis joined, was
agnostic as to whether the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
regulate labor relations in coal mining. 20 2 Nevertheless, Carter proved
to be the last case in which the Hughes Court invalidated New Deal leg-
islation. Indeed, nearly sixty years would pass before the Supreme Court
of the United States would next invalidate an Act of Congress on the
197 See id. at 302-04.
198 Id. at 307 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 309. Some have suggested that Sutherland went further than prior precedent
when he insisted that the magnitude of a regulated subject's impact on interstate commerce
was constitutionally irrelevant. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 121, at 224 (asserting that "there
was no compelling reason for Sutherland's conclusion that the magnitude of the effect had to
be ignored").
201 After acknowledging that "Congress ... has adequate authority to maintain the orderly
conduct of interstate commerce and to provide for the peaceful settlement of disputes which
threaten it," Chief Justice Hughes continued: "But Congress may not use this protective au-
thority as a pretext for the exertion of power to regulate activities and relations within the
states which affect interstate commerce only indirectly." Carter, 298 U.S. at 317 (Hughes,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Hughes supported the point by suggesting that
were the Court to hold otherwise it would in effect amend the Constitution. Id. at 318 ("If the
people desire to give Congress the power to regulate industries within the state, and the rela-
tions of employers and employees in those industries, they are at liberty to declare their will in
the appropriate manner, but it is not for the Court to amend the Constitution by judicial deci-
sion."). The Chief Justice wrote separately, however, solely because he rejected the majority's
additional conclusions that the price-fixing provisions could not be severed from the labor
sections of the Act and, thus, that the former had to fall with the latter. Id. at 312-16.
202 Cardozo dismissed as premature the complainants' challenge to the labor sections of
the Act, and would have avoided ruling on their constitutionality. Id. at 341 (Cardozo, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ground that it exceeded congressional authority over interstate
commerce.
2. Roosevelt's Second Term
Between the May 1935 press conference held in reaction to
Schechter Poultry and his November 1936 reelection, President
Roosevelt avoided public comment on the Supreme Court.20 3 Others
were far less restrained. The decade-old chorus of criticism reached a
crescendo as New Deal innovations failed Supreme Court review. Con-
stitutional challenges to the New Deal made the previously academic
controversy concerning the Court's federalism rulings a central aspect of
national political discourse. Not surprisingly, the Court's critics grew in
number and became sharper in tone.
One of the new voices was J. A. C. Grant, then a junior political
science professor at the University of California at Los Angeles. In two
lengthy and trenchant articles published in 1936 in the Yale Law Journal,
Grant relied upon the Harrison Act cases to demonstrate that an unbiased
solicitude for the states' reserved powers could not explain the Court's
hostility to either federal child labor laws or the New Deal. For example,
federal narcotics regulation invaded the states' police powers at least as
materially as the statutes the Court voided on this ground. Grant charac-
terized the Harrison Act as in reality "a series of regulations obviously
intended to bring the sale of narcotics into the open and to forbid their
sale for other than what Congress considered to be legitimate purposes,
thereby vesting criminal jurisdiction in national hands to punish any anti-
social sales.''204 Grant dismissed Chief Justice Taft's efforts to distin-
guish Doremus in his opinion for the Court in the Child Labor Tax Case.
All that Taft said of the congressional effort to impose a "'Tax on Em-
ployment of Child Labor'"205 could have been said of the Harrison Act.
Grant answered Taft's claim by noting that in the case of the child labor
tax, the congressional subterfuge had been obvious with the rejoinder:
"Do we not commonly refer to the statute involved in United States v.
Doremus as the Harrison anti-Narcotic Act? ... [T]he purpose of the
Narcotic Act was equally spread upon the face of the statute. °20 6
By 1936, these fifteen-year-old cases might have been matters of
merely historical interest, but Grant used them to lay the foundation for
his attack on the Court's decisions in Alton and especially Butler. The
203 "Each adverse decision produced new outbursts of hostility [from various affected
New Deal constituencies], but only stony silence came from the White House." MCKENNA,
supra note 169, at 181.
204 J. A. C. Grant, Commerce, Production, and the Fiscal Powers of Congress, 45 YALE
L.J. 751, 758 (1936).
205 Id. at 759.
206 Id.
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selectivity of the Court's commitment to federalism belied the reasoning
of Justice Roberts's majority opinions in both cases. Grant concluded
that the decisions were primarily driven by the Court's hostility to the
Roosevelt Administration and its policy agenda, notwithstanding Justice
Roberts's repeated pleas to the contrary. Grant acknowledged that "[t]he
majority has been extremely careful to avoid any intimation that it is the
philosophy of those now in high places which it finds distasteful. 20 7
Citing the Supreme Court bar's rhetoric against the New Deal, Grant
stressed that "[c]ounsel, however, do not seem to have been impressed
by [the Court's] linguistic quiescence. '20 8 Grant was no less suspicious.
In his view, the result in Alton had nothing to do with federalism:
There are reasons for suspecting that the real basis of the
majority's opinion was a belief that any such act would
violate the niceties of due process of law, and hence
could not be justified under any power possessed by ei-
ther [state or federal] government, the explanation that
as a regulation of commerce it exceeds the powers of
Congress being seized upon merely because it might
meet with greater degree of popular approval. 209
Grant was even harsher in his assessment of Roberts's Butler opin-
ion, which he found to be plainly illogical210 and a "sophistic
phantasy. ' '21' Federalism masked the majority Justices' true object-"to
expand the arena of [their] discretion," and thus increase their own
power. 212 Grant acknowledged that these were certainly not the first Jus-
tices to succumb to this ambition, but he closed by warning that in Butler
the Court had perhaps exceeded its institutional capacity. Limited to
resolving justiciable cases or controversies, "it is entirely probable that"
the Court had "undertaken a bigger task than it can handle. '213 The
course of events over the next half decade proved Grant prophetic.
By 1936 the Court had numerous enemies, but none were more
prominent and persistent than Princeton professor Edward S. Corwin, ar-
guably the most distinguished scholar of American constitutional law
then living.214 In a brief preface, dated May 26, 1936, to his book The
207 Id. at 769 n.101.
208 Id.
209 J. A. C. Grant, Commerce, Production, and the Fiscal Powers of Congress: II, 45
YALE L.J. 991, 996 (1936).
210 Id. at 1012.
211 Id. at 1017.
212 Id. at 1019.
213 Id. at 1021.
214 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 17 (2000) (describing
Corwin as "one of the ablest American scholars of the twentieth century"); Gerald Garvey,
Edward S. Corwin in the Campaign of History: The Struggle for National Power in the 1930s,
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Commerce Power Versus States Rights, Professor Corwin made plain his
considered view that the Court had, in Alton, Butler, and Carter, far ex-
ceeded its proper role. He dismissed the Court's protestations to the ef-
fect that it was merely preserving federalism. That assertion was belied
by the "inconsistency" of the Court's efforts, which the Court had con-
fined "for the most part to national action touching productive industry,
and particularly the employer-employee relationship in such industry. 215
When federal criminal or other morals regulations were at issue, how-
ever, the concern for the "Federal System and States Rights" receded into
the background. 216 In the ensuing compact but forceful volume, Corwin
repeatedly confronted the Court with its failures to enforce limits on con-
gressional authority when examining the constitutionality of statutes that
the Justices apparently deemed desirable as a policy matter. As much as,
if not more than, Corwin challenged the historical and jurisprudential
foundations of the conservative Justices' circumscribed view of federal
power, he exposed their assertions that they were really concerned about
federalism at all as counterfeit. Rather, their rulings sustaining federal
morals regulations revealed that they too were nationalists when being so
advanced their policy preferences. These policy-based assessments
were, everyone conceded, the province of the legislature, not the judici-
ary. Accordingly, the Court's duty was clear: to cease its opposition to
the New Deal agenda.217
The focus of Professor Corwin's book was on the commerce power
rather than on the taxing power. Nevertheless, he based his central argu-
ment on the Court's Harrison Act decisions. These rulings were crucial
to Corwin's case that the Justices had only a selective solicitude for the
Tenth Amendment that safeguarded their reserved powers only when
dosing so comported with their personal policy predilections. On the
question of whether the "reserved powers" limited the manner in which
Congress might exercise one of its enumerated powers, early twentieth-
century jurists have attempted to have it both ways. An affirmative an-
swer was "only one of a pair of horses which the Court has ready saddled
and bridled, depending on the direction it wishes to ride-the other being
34 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 219, 219 (1965) (asserting that Corwin "stands among the giants of
American constitutional commentators-with Kent, Story, and Cooley").
215 CORWIN, supra note 122, at ix.
216 Id. at x; see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 25-26
(1941) (concluding that the Court's precedents provided "a body of materials out of which a
relatively broad theory of Congress's power over interstate may be built, and likewise a body
of materials out of which a relatively narrow theory may be built," hence allowing the Hughes
Court "to decide the questions of constitutional interpretation which the New Deal legislation
raised largely on grounds of public policy, on legislative grounds in short").
217 See generally CORWIN, supra note 122, at 265, 266-69 (imploring the Court to reverse
its course and "correct its own errors").
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the supremacy clause of the Constitution itself."218 For illustration of
this point, Corwin juxtaposed Justice Day's inconsistent votes and state-
ments in Hammer, on the one hand, and in Doremus, on the other. In
Hammer, the Court, speaking through Justice Day, found it determinative
that in closing the pathways of interstate commerce to users of child la-
bor, Congress had sought to affect methods of production, this being a
matter from time out of mind which belonged to the police power of the
States. In Doremus, Justice Day discarded as irrelevant the Harrison
Act's very substantial usurpation of the States' power to protect public
morality. 219 The next decade added insult to injury. When the narcotic
interests emboldened by Justice McReynolds's suggestion that the Court
might reconsider the Harrison Act's constitutionality again brought the
matter to the Justices in the Nigro case, "the Court-Justices McReyn-
olds, Sutherland, and Butler dissenting-refused to deliver the goods. '220
Nor did Professor Corwin restrict his formidable talents to the realm
of scholarly disputation. He confidentially proposed, and then publicly
championed, the Roosevelt Administration's notorious "Court-packing
plan" of February, 1937.221 Since then Supreme Court scholars have de-
bated whether the Justices switched courses after the Spring in order to
avoid a confrontation with the President, or whether the jurisprudential
house of cards came tumbling down of its own accord-the end result of
a process that had long been in progress. 222 Thankfully, for present pur-
poses there is no need to choose sides in the debate between the "exter-
nal" and "internal" accounts. 223  The fickle quality of the Court's
federalism enforcement left its enumerated powers jurisprudence woe-
218 Id. at 167.
219 Id. at 168.
220 See U.S. v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1919).
221 Edward S. Corwin, Standpoint in Constitutional Law, 17 B.U. L. REv. 513, 531
(1937) (discussing Corwin's wry verdict on the effectiveness of the Court-packing plan); see
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 184, at 115-19 (discussing Corwin's role in the origins of the
Court-packing plan).
222 Compare LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 184, at 142-43, and Corwin, supra note 221, at
531, with BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CON-
STrOUTIoNAL REVOLUTION 5 (1998), and WHITE, supra note 214, at 1-4. See generally
Michael Ariens, A Thrice-told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REv. 620, 652-66 (1994)
(recounting historiography of the Court's 1937 "switch"); Joseph Biancalana, Originalism and
the Commerce Clause, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 383, 399-403 (2002) (describing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence of the Hughes Court); Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
95, 107 (1999) (charting position taken by Justice Owen Roberts throughout the New Deal
Era); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes
Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1897 (1994) (painting a
picture "of a less sudden, discontinuous shift, and one less affected by immediate political
factors, than may be connoted by the phrase 'constitutional revolution of 1937"'); G. Edward
White, The "Constitutional Revolution" as a Crisis in Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 895
(1997) (challenging conventional treatment of the New Deal Court).
223 See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 222, at 5 (distinguishing between "external" and "in-
ternal" accounts of jurisprudential transformation during the 1930s).
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fully precarious. Whether that frailty fell to the force of political pres-
sures outside the Court or to the force of intellectual disharmonies
intrinsic to it, the Justices' inconsistency in their efforts to preserve fed-
eralism played a significant role in the Court's eventual abandonment of
the whole endeavor. In fact, nearly sixty years passed before the Court
would reassert any significant role in confining Congress to its enumer-
ated powers.
II. FEDERALISM IN THE REHNQUIST COURT
Between 1936 and 1995, the Court upheld every federal statute reg-
ulating private conduct challenged as beyond Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause. Countless post-World War II decisions affirmed
the broadening assertions of this congressional authority. As one leading
commentator observed, "by the 1980s the Commerce Clause game
seemed about over. Case book editors were driven to dream up wild
hypotheticals to try to find ways to encourage students to consider
whether the commerce power had any practical limits at all."' 24
A. GUNS NEAR SCHOOLS
Then, for the first time in nearly sixty years, the Supreme Court
shocked the legal community by striking down a federal statute on the
ground that it was beyond the reach of Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce. In United States v. Lopez, the Court invalidated the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (hereinafter § 922(q)), that had
made it a federal crime for any unauthorized person "knowingly to pos-
sess" a firearm "within a distance of 1000 feet from the grounds of a
public, parochial, or private school. '225 In March of 1992, Alfonso Lo-
pez, then a senior at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived
to school carrying a .38-caliber handgun and five bullets.22 6 School au-
thorities, alerted to the possibility that Lopez might be armed, confronted
him, and he admitted possession of a gun.227 Lopez was initially charged
224 Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adju-
dication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695, 701 & n.39 (1996). See
generally DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 789, 813, 817 (1993) (questioning whether
congressional power could reach a child's front-yard lemonade stand); GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140 (12th ed. 1991) (contemplating federal prohibition on possession of
all pills because of the difficulty in distinguishing dangerous pills from others); GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 197, 209 (2d ed. 1991) (suggesting federal prohibition of
shoplifting and federal regulation of lawns, parking lots, and disposal of trash at carry-out
restaurants).
225 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) &
922(q)(1)(A) 1988 ed., Supp. V).
226 Id.
227 Id.
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with violating the Texas Penal Code; however, the state prosecution was
subsequently dismissed when federal authorities indicted Lopez for vio-
lating § 922(q). 228 After a federal district judge, via a bench trial con-
victed and sentenced Lopez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed his conviction, holding that § 922(q) exceeded the enu-
merated powers of Congress. 229 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and by a narrow, five-Justice majority, affirmed the Fifth Circuit
Court's ruling.230
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court attempted to
demonstrate the invalidity of § 922(q) without overruling any of the
Court's Commerce Clause precedents. The Chief Justice identified four
ways in which the majority found § 922(q) to be more constitutionally
problematic than other federal statutes that the Court had previously up-
held. First, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that, whereas prior rulings
had sustained the constitutionality of statutes regulating intrastate eco-
nomic activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
§922(q) was "a criminal statute that by its terms ha[d] nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define such terms. '23 1 Moreover, "Section 922(q) [was] not es-
sential to the larger regulation of economic activity where the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity was regulated. 232
Thus the Chief Justice contended that most of the Court's modern Com-
merce Clause rulings were simply inapposite.2 33
The Chief Justice also noted a second defect in § 922(q) because it
lacked any "jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-
case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affect[ed] interstate
commerce. '234 A third flaw in § 922(q) was the absence of "legislative
findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding
[the] effect [of handgun possession near schools] on interstate com-
merce. '235 Finally, in answering both government and Court dissent in
228 Id.
229 Id. at 552.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 561.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 561 (concluding that § 922(q) could not, "therefore, be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial trans-
action, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce"). The Chief
Justice thus dispensed with the so-called aggregation principle established by the Court in
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I 11(1942). Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 562 (emphasis added) (Chief Justice acknowledging that "Congress normally is
not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce" and hinting that Congress might have saved § 922(q) had it made appro-
priate and substantiated factual findings); see id. at 563 (observing that "to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in
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support of the Act, the Chief Justice highlighted a fourth way in which it
was constitutionally problematic. As a criminal provision addressing a
threat to education, §922(q) invaded regulatory spheres historically the
exclusive province of the states. If the Court were to endorse either the
government's or the dissent's theories, it would be "difficult to perceive
any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law, en-
forcement, or education, where States historically have been
sovereign." 236
At the conclusion of his opinion for the Court, the Chief Justice
admitted prior precedents accorded "great deference to congressional ac-
tion," thereby taking "long steps down [the] road" in granting Congress
"a general police power of the sort retained by the states. '237 Though
"[t]he broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of
additional expansion," on this occasion the Court declined the invita-
tion.238 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained "to proceed any further...
would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of pow-
ers does not presuppose something not enumerated. This we are unwill-
ing to do."'239
To the dissenting Justices, the Chief Justice's canny parsing of the
modem Commerce Clause cases missed the forest for the trees. In the
dissenters' view, notwithstanding the modem Court's occasional paean
to the virtues of federalism, the fundamental teaching of the precedents
when examined together was that the Supreme Court had virtually no
role in second-guessing a Congressional determination that a matter fell
within the compass of its Commerce Clause authority. 240 Justice Souter
question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here"); A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Sime-
one, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Re-
view of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. Rv. 328 (2001) (criticizing judicial reliance in
constitutional cases on perceived gaps in the formal legislative record); see also William Buz-
bee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2001); Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Philip P. Frickey
& Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases:
An Interdisciplinary Critique, Ill YALE L.J. 1707 (2002) (questioning wisdom and legitimacy
of legislative record review). But see Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers
Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DuKE L.J. 435, 453 (2001) (asserting that
Congress virtually invited Supreme Court invalidation of numerous federal statutes and ob-
serving that "in several cases restricting Congress's Section 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
powers, Congress' factfinding was too limited or nonexistent").
236 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
237 Id. at 567.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 567-68.
240 See, e.g., id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The practice of deferring to rationally
based legislative judgments is a paradigm of judicial restraint" which is especially appropriate
insofar as congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause is concerned because "[iln
judicial review under the Commerce Clause, [this judicial deference] reflects our respect for
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even suggested that the majority's ruling might ultimately result in a
replay of the ill-fated confrontation between Congress and the Court dur-
ing the New Deal Era.241 Most telling was Justice Breyer's failure to
answer the majority's challenge to "identify any activity that the States
may regulate but Congress may not. ' 242 And yet, the dissenters' unspo-
ken rebuttal was that the Court had, decades before, interred the enumer-
ated powers doctrine. On this view, the absence of any judicially
enforceable limit on Congress's Commerce Clause authority was simply
the pre-Lopez status quo. It was the majority's assertion that such a limit
must be found that was revolutionary.
Even worse, the dissenters argued, the majority not only upset the
preexisting legal order, but also failed to articulate any intelligible substi-
tute to take its place. Lopez then "threaten[ed] legal uncertainty in an
area of law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled. '243 On
this point, Justice Stevens's succinct, two-paragraph dissent delivered the
crucial blow. His opinion was the only dissenting opinion to address the
majority on its own terms. His one "additional comment" that he ap-
pended to his emphatic concurrence to the opinions of Justice Souter and
Justice Breyer was that, even assuming that Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause was limited to regulation of "commerce" or some
"sort of economic enterprise," 244 § 922(q) was nevertheless within the
scope of congressional power because "[g]uns are articles of commerce.
Their possession is the consequence, either directly or indirectly, of com-
mercial activity." 24 5 Indeed, if a farmer's consumption of his own home-
grown wheat could, as the Lopez majority contended, be characterized as
the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Con-
stitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's political accounta-
bility in dealing with matters open to a wide range of possible choices.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J. dissenting) ("Courts must give Con-
gress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual connection be-
tween the regulated activity and interstate commerce-both because the Constitution delegates
the commerce power directly to Congress and because the determination requires an empirical
judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy. The
traditional words 'rational basis' capture this leeway.").
241 See id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[I]t seems fair to ask whether the step taken by
the Court today does anything but portend a return to the untenable jurisprudence from which
the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago. The answer is not reassuring.").
242 Id. at 564. Justice Breyer suggested some aspects of family life might be beyond
congressional reach even under his analysis because "the connection between education and
the national economic well-being is documented by scholars and accepted by society at large
in a way and to a degree that may not hold true for other social institutions." Id. at 624
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). But on this score at least the Chief Justice seemed to
have the last word when he observed that Justice Breyer's "suggested limitations, when
viewed in light of the dissent's expansive analysis, are devoid of substance." Id. at 565.
243 Id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 561.
245 Id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"involv[ing] economic activity" so as to bring it within Congress's Com-
merce Clause power, at the very least it required more elaboration than
the Chief Justice provided to establish that Alfonso Lopez's public pos-
session of a .38-caliber handgun could not also be so characterized. 246
Guns are mass-produced and sold in interstate and international markets.
Whether, as Filburn's ill-fated constitutional challenge to the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act claimed, the Filburn farm could fairly be character-
ized as a self-contained system isolated from interstate wheat markets, it
is impossible to take seriously the prospect of Alfonso Lopez forging the
steel for his home-made hand gun from raw ore extracted solely from his
Texas estate. The point, of course, is not that the latter showing ought to
be required before gun possession near schools should be excluded from
the realm of congressional authority, but that in invalidating §922(q)
while at the same time reaffirming the correctness of Wickard v. Filburn,
the Lopez majority embraced fundamentally irreconcilable propositions.
As the dissenters claimed, this mixed message introduced hopeless con-
fusion into the law. Thus, in lieu of reviving the durable enumerated
powers doctrine, the Lopez decision yielded only doctrinal incoherence.
B. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Not surprisingly, Lopez provoked considerable political and aca-
demic criticism though, to be sure, it had its determined defenders in
both quarters as well.24 7 In the lower federal courts, however, things
continued much as they had before the 1995 ruling. Between 1995 and
1999, the U.S. Courts of Appeals rejected every Commerce Clause chal-
lenge to a major federal statute.248 It was as though they uniformly inter-
246 Id. at 560.
247 See, e.g., Symposium, The New Federalism after United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 635 (1996) (reflecting diverse viewpoints); Symposium, Reflections on United
States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 533 (1995) (reflecting diverse viewpoints). Compare, e.g.,
Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1996)
(supporting Justice Thomas's concurring opinion), and Charles Fried, Foreword. Revolu-
tions?, 109 HAev. L. REv. 13, 34-45 (1995) (defending Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the Court), with Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Com-
merce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REv. 719, 720 (1996) (arguing that "instead of seeking to reactivate
federalism review, the Court should make its withdrawal from the area explicit"). Nor was the
debate confined to academic quarters. In the immediate wake of the decision President Clin-
ton, "in an unusually pointed Presidential comment on a Court ruling," criticized Lopez during
his weekly radio address. Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in School
Zones, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 1995, at Al. During the address he also announced publicly that
he had called upon Attorney General Janet Reno to find ways to circumvent the ruling. Id. In
contrast, "Congressional Republicans generally applauded the Court's solicitude toward the
states." Linda Greenhouse, Justices Step in as Federalism's Referee, N.Y. TIMES, April 28,
1995, at Al.
248 See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis.
L. REv. 369, 385 n.85 & 396 (2000) (noting that the Fourth Circuit's 1999 decision invalidat-
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preted Lopez as an aberration, properly limited to its particular facts. The
Supreme Court in turn side-stepped every call to clarify Lopez's prece-
dential significance, consistently denying petitions for certiorari in nu-
merous post-Lopez Commerce Clause cases. 249 But then, after the Court
had managed to stay out of the fray for four years, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in effect forced the Court's hand by inval-
idating the civil-suit provision of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA). 250 Enacted in 1994, the VAWA had been a relatively recent
political accomplishment. Accordingly, the Solicitor General asked the
Supreme Court to review the Fourth Circuit ruling, and the Court, fol-
lowing its tradition of honoring these requests, agreed to hear the case. 25'
In United States v. Morrison, the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
ruling and invalidated the challenged the VAWA section, but provided
only modest clarification as to the meaning of Lopez. 252
Unlike the Gun Free School Zones Act, the VAWA was supported
by a "mountain of data assembled by Congress" as part of the formal
legislative record "showing the effects of violence against women on in-
terstate commerce. ' '253 In Morrison, however, the Court dismissed this
evidence as irrelevant. 254 Writing again for the same five justices com-
prising the Lopez majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, even if
the legislative record proved that intrastate gender-animated violence
has, in the aggregate, a substantial impact on interstate commerce, the
civil-remedy provision of the VAWA was nevertheless unconstitu-
ing the civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act was the first U.S. Court of
Appeals ruling "to hold a federal statute unconstitutional based on a Lopez challenge" and that
previously the Supreme Court had consistently "denied certiorari in cases that would have
clarified the scope of Lopez").
249 See id.
250 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994), invalidated by United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000).
251 See Brief for the United States, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (99-5,
99-29). "Because the Court of Appeals invalidated a federal statute on constitutional grounds,
we granted certiorari." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605.
252 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602.
253 Id. at 628-29 (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Conference Committee Report on
the VAWA included express, detailed findings, including the determination that:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on inter-
state commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engag-
ing in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in
places involved, in interstate commerce ..., by diminishing national productivity,
increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for
interstate products.
H.R. REP. No. 103-711 at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853.
254 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-22.
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tional. 255 The Chief Justice's majority opinion stressed the Court's re-
luctance to aggregate the effects of individual instances of intrastate,
non-economic activity when deciding whether the activity had the requi-
site substantial effect on interstate commerce. 256 Nonetheless, the Chief
Justice, declined to commit the Court to never aggregating non-economic
activity: "While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating
the effects of any non-economic activity in order to decide these cases,
thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in
nature. '257 The majority did not deem the case for the VAWA's civil
remedy sufficiently compelling to depart from this tradition.258 Moreo-
ver, in the view of the majority, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence
are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. '259 Accordingly,
the majority refused to aggregate the effects of these crimes on interstate
commerce to provide a foundation for congressional authority.260
Like the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court, the dissenting opin-
ions in Morrison closely paralleled their Lopez counterparts. The inter-
vening half decade had, however, ripened the dissenters' initial
incredulity into something approaching outrage. For example, Justice
Souter charged that the majority's invalidation of the challenged the
VAWA section could not be reconciled with three landmark commerce
clause precedents the majority purported to reaffirm. 26' According to
Justice Souter, the Court's two decisions confirming congressional
power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964262 established that Congress
was free to employ its Commerce Clause authority to achieve moral or
255 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. The Court also held that the VAWA's civil-remedy
provision was beyond the scope of the authority granted Congress by section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment; id. at 619-22.
256 See id. at 609-11.
257 See id. at 613.
258 See id. at 613-14.
259 Id. at 613.
260 Id. at 614-16. Scholars responded to Lopez and Morrison by revisiting a longstanding
debate about the original meaning of the Commerce Clause; see also Robert H. Bork & Daniel
E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 879-83 (2002); Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analy-
sis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1256-71 (2003). Com-
pare Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 97, at 19-21 (late eighteenth-century understanding of
"commerce" included both trade and manufacturing), with Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 101, 129-30 (2001) (noting the distinc-
tion in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), between commerce and manufac-
turing in keeping with late eighteenth-century understanding of the terms and their usage by
the founders in the Philadelphia and state ratifying conventions), and Grant S. Nelson & Rob-
ert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U.
L. REv. 695, 707-11 (2002) (replying to Professor Barnett).
261 See id. at 654-55 (Souter J., dissenting).
262 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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social, rather than economic, ends.263 Hence, that Congress almost cer-
tainly enacted the VAWA out of a loathing for violence against women
rather than for the purpose of clearing impediments to an integrated
economy was immaterial to the Commerce Clause issue.264 Justice Sou-
ter likewise argued that the majority's effort to distinguish the VAWA
from prior constitutionally valid federal laws on the ground that violence
against women was "noneconomic" and therefore beyond the scope of
Wickard's aggregation principle faltered because Wickard concerned
Congress's power over non-commercial activity (growth of wheat for
home consumption). 265 Justice Souter stressed that these were not incon-
sequential inconsistencies. 266 To the contrary, they produced a legal in-
determinacy that left the scope of congressional power very much to the
eyes of a few supreme judicial beholders. Justice Souter prophesied that
such an unstable legal regime could not long endure.267
Ultimately, Morrison provided precious little guidance to the lower
courts about the scope of any federalism revival. Still, Morrison did
clarify a few fundamental issues. First, the outcome indicated that Lopez
was not merely a solitary signal of the Court's displeasure with Con-
gress's inattention to the limits on its own authority. To the contrary, the
result in Morrison seemingly portended a line of High Court rulings that
would develop real, judicially enforceable boundaries on congressional
authority. Second, though the Chief Justice assiduously and madden-
ingly avoided articulating any "categorical rule," his assertion in his ma-
jority opinion that "thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activ-
ity is economic in nature," strongly implied that the Clause authorized
Congress to reach into a state only if the object of congressional regula-
263 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
264 See id.
265 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 643-45 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("It was obvious in Wickard
that growing wheat for consumption right on the farm was not "commerce" in the common
vocabulary, but that did not matter constitutionally so long as the aggregated activity of do-
mestic wheat growing affected commerce substantially.") (citation omitted); accord Nelson &
Pushaw, supra note 97, at 121 ("growing [wheat] for one's own use without the intent to sell is
simply not commerce").
266 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 643-45.
267 "Cases standing for the sufficiency of substantial effects are not overruled; cases over-
ruled since 1937 are not quite revived. The Court's thinking betokens less clearly a return to
the conceptual straitjackets of Schechter and Carter Coal and Usery than to something like the
unsteady state of obscenity law between Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per
curiam), and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), a period in which the failure to provide
a workable definition left this Court to review each case ad hoc. As our predecessors learned
then, the practice of such ad hoc review cannot preserve the distinction between the judicial
and the legislative, and this Court, in any event, lacks the institutional capacity to maintain
such a regime for very long." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 654-55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
20071
146 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:101
tion could be deemed economic.2 68 Precisely what was economic for
these purposes, however, was left largely unresolved.
III. JUST ANOTHER CASUALTY IN THE WAR ON DRUGS?
A. "REEFER MADNESS"
Great enthusiasm and hope in at least some quarters attended the
Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison. Those rulings seemed to sig-
nal a renewed, albeit hesitant and fragile, judicial will to impose some
meaningful constraints on congressional authority. Such aspirations,
however, were dealt a lethal blow by the Court's decision in Gonzales v.
Raich.269
Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson filed suit in a U.S. district
court seeking a declaration that the federal Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) could not be applied to their cultivation and possession of mari-
juana for personal medical use, which was permitted by the law of their
home state, California.270 In particular, they argued that, as applied, the
CSA exceeded Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 271
For several years prior to filing suit, Raich and Monson-both of
whom suffered from what the Court termed a "variety of serious medical
conditions"-had regularly consumed marijuana to treat some of their
numerous, severe symptoms.2 72 Their consumption of the drug con-
formed with both the advice of their licensed, board-certified family phy-
sicians and with California's Compassionate Use Act. 273 As the Court
acknowledged, their physicians had exhausted all alternative treatments
before concluding that marijuana alone provided effective relief 27 4
Moreover Raich's physician opined that if Raich stopped using mari-
juana she would certainly suffer excruciating pain and perhaps death due
to precipitous weight loss and wasting syndrome. 275 Perhaps most im-
portantly, Raich and Monson did everything they could to distance the
marijuana they consumed from any activity even arguably economic in
nature.276 Moreover, they also assiduously avoided any connection be-
268 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
269 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
270 See id. at 5-8.
271 Id. at 8, 15. Raich and Monson also argued that applying the CSA to their conduct
violated "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
and the doctrine of medical necessity." Id. at 8. The Supreme Court expressly declined to
reach the substantive due process and medical necessity arguments. Id. at 33.
272 Id. at 6-7.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 7.
275 See id.; Brief for Respondents at 4-5, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-
1454).
276 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 7; Brief for Respondents, supra note 275, at 6-7.
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tween their marijuana and the world outside California.2 77 For example,
the cannabis Raich used was "grown using only soil, water, nutrients,
equipment, supplies, and lumber originating from or manufactured
within California. ' '278 And although Raich was unable, presumably due
to her physical condition, to cultivate her own marijuana plants (as did
Monson), two caregivers did this for her, entirely free of charge.279 Fi-
nally Raich and Monson had good reason to fear federal prosecution. In
August 2002, federal Drug Enforcement Agents entered Monson's home
and "seized and destroyed all six of her cannabis plants. 28°
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court squarely rejected Raich and Mon-
son's Commerce Clause claim in opinion by Justice Stevens, in which he
was joined by the three other Lopez and Morrison dissenters as well as
Justice Kennedy. 281 That majority reasoned that the plaintiffs' legal
claim was governed by "well-settled law," that compelled the conclusion
that "[t]he CSA [was] a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied
to the troubling facts of this case.1 28 2 Justice Stevens's opinion for the
Court drew heavily on its exceedingly generous post-1937, pre-Lopez
Commerce Clause rulings. 283 Of course, under these precedents alone,
the case for constitutionality was obvious and easy. Prior to Lopez, the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence appeared to permit congres-
sional regulation of virtually any private conduct. Therefore, it was easy
for Justice Stevens to demonstrate that even the possession of home-
grown marijuana used solely for medicinal purposes in conformity with
state law-like anything else in twenty-first century America's intercon-
nected, commercial society-fell within the ambit of Congress's power,
as measured by pre-Lopez jurisprudence.2 84 More challenging was the
task of explaining how this reasoning and conclusion could be squared
with the Court's intervening rulings in Lopez and Morrison.
Those two decisions appeared to re-impose some, albeit rather in-
definite, constraints on congressional power. If, as Lopez and especially
Morrison suggested, Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause
277 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 7; Brief for Respondents, supra note 275, at 6.
278 Brief for Respondents, supra note 275, at 6. "Monson's 'cultivation of marijuana
[was] similarly local in nature.'" Id.
279 Raich, 545 U.S. at 7; id. at 6-7.
280 Id. at 7. The Supreme Court elected to hear the case after the U.S. Court of Appeals
held that Raich and Monson were entitled to a preliminary injunction against federal enforce-
ment because they had "demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on their claim that, as
applied to them, the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause au-
thority." Id. at 8 (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (2003)).
281 Id. at 3-4, 9. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were the other Lopez and Morri-
son dissenters. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 550 (1995).
282 Raich, 545 U.S. at 8.
283 See id. at 17-22.
284 See id. at 25-33.
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was limited to "economic" activity, in what way was mere possession of
locally grown marijuana for medicinal use, but not possession of a hand-
gun, "economic"? 28 5 Justice Stevens essentially dismissed this question
by resort to that most versatile of weapons in the judicial armory-ipse
dixit, i.e., it's true because we say so. First, Justice Stevens broadly de-
fined "economics" to include all "production, distribution, and consump-
tion of commodities. '28 6  From this premise, it was a brief,
unobjectionable step to the conclusion that, because "there is an estab-
lished, and lucrative, interstate market" for illegal marijuana,
"[p]rohibiting the intrastate possession ...of [marijuana] ... [was] a
rational... means of regulating commerce in that product. '287 Why the
Gun Free School Zones Act's prohibition on possession of guns near
schools could not likewise have been sustained as a rational means of
regulating commerce in that product was not explained. Indeed, Stevens
had, in his Lopez dissent, made this very argument for the constitutional-
ity of that Act. 288
To be sure, Justice Stevens also stressed that, whereas Lopez and
Morrison had concerned claims that "a particular statute or provision fell
outside Congress's commerce power in its entirety," Raich and Monson
challenged "individual applications of a concededly valid statutory
scheme. '289 Stevens explained that this distinction was "pivotal" be-
cause prior rulings established that "where the class of activities is regu-
lated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have
no power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class. '290 Un-
like the CSA, the statutory provision the Court invalidated in Lopez was
"not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate ac-
tivity were regulated."'29 1 But Justice Stevens irredeemably, though per-
haps quite intentionally, intermingled this second basis for distinguishing
285 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
286 Id. at 25-26 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720
(1966)). As Professor Massey has observed that, in an age of relentless commodification, this
definition reaches virtually everything. See Calvin Massey, The Constitution in a Postmodern
Age, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 209-10 (2007).
287 Raich, 545 U.S. at 26.
288 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "[g]uns are...
articles of commerce" and that "[tiheir possession is the consequence, either directly or indi-
rectly, of commercial activity"); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Lopez makes clear that possession is not itself commercial activity."); Jiang, supra note 18,
at 559 ("While gun possession in a school zone certainly could not constitute a 'production' or
'distribution' of the relevant commodity (guns), it can certainly be deemed a 'consumption' of
that commodity.").
289 Raich, 545 U.S. at 3.
290 Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
291 Id. at 24 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
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Lopez with the first, far weaker one: that marijuana possession was
somehow "economic" but gun possession was not.
Thus it fell to Justice Scalia, who concurred in the result but not in
the majority opinion, to differentiate between these two arguments and
provide a perhaps more compelling and certainly more novel elaboration
of the stronger one. Implicitly conceding that mere possession of mari-
juana could not be characterized as "economic" for the purposes of Lo-
pez and Morrison, Scalia stressed that congressional authority over
"intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce"
could not be derived from the Commerce Clause alone.292 Rather, this
authority also depended upon the Constitution's explicit conferral upon
Congress of the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution" the other powers expressly enumer-
ated in Article I, section 8-including, of course, the power to regulate
interstate commerce. 293 Justice Scalia insisted that the authority con-
ferred by the Necessary and Proper Clause encompassed intrastate activ-
ity even if that activity neither "substantially affected" interstate
commerce nor was itself "economic," so long as governance of that ac-
tivity was somehow "necessary to make a regulation of interstate com-
merce effective." 294 Accordingly, that simple possession itself was "a
noneconomic activity [was] immaterial to whether it [could] be prohib-
ited as a necessary part of a larger regulation. '295 It sufficed that the
CSA's prohibition of marijuana possession was an "appropriate means"
of, or that it was "reasonabl(y) adapted" to, "achieving the legitimate end
of eradicating [proscribed narcotics] from interstate commerce. 296
Justice O'Connor's dissent (which was in substance joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) observed that Justice Scalia's
analysis, like the majority's, failed to distinguish Lopez. Justice
O'Connor argued that the federal prohibition on possession of a gun near
a school could have, like the CSA's prohibition of marijuana possession,
been explained as "an appropriate means of effectuating" the related fed-
eral criminal prohibition on selling or delivering firearms to a minor.297
292 Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
293 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
294 Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. John T. Valauri, The Clothes Have
No Emperor, or, Cabining the Commerce Clause, 41 SAN DINGo L. REv. 405, 425-28 (2004)
(discussing the relevance of the doctrine of incidental powers to Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
295 Raich, 545 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
296 Id. at 19, 21 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
297 Id. at 52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (1998 ed., Supp. II));
cf. Maxwell Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical Perspective,
60 VAND. L. REv. 1, 4 (2007) ("The Raich Court did not offer any satisfactory theory that
reconciled the post-New Deal Commerce Clause expansion with the more recent doctrinal
retrenchments represented by Lopez and Morrison.").
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Justice Scalia rarely leaves an argument unanswered, and this de-
bate proved no exception. But the answer he gave was telling in its inad-
equacy. Scalia first reiterated the Lopez Court's bald assertion "that the
statute at issue there was 'not an essential part of larger regulation of
economic activity.' "298 His sole effort to substantiate this claim, how-
ever, was to pronounce it "difficult to imagine what intelligible scheme
of regulation of the interstate market in guns could have as an appropri-
ate means of effectuation the prohibition of guns within 1000 feet of
schools (and nowhere else). '299 If so, this failure in imagination was
unusual even for a lawyer. Central to the lives of most U.S. minors is
school attendance; accordingly, it is hardly unimaginable that harsh and
certain punishment of gun possession near schools would, in the aggre-
gate, tend to diminish minors' demand for such weapons in the interstate
marketplace. 300 The connection may be an attenuated one, but no more
so than the link between legally authorized use of non-commercial,
home-grown marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to a physician's
order and the illegal (under both federal and state law) interstate market
supplying the drug for recreation.
To his credit Justice Thomas, much like Justice McReynolds a cen-
tury earlier, adhered to legal principle, even when doing so set aside a
federal policy he likely favored as a personal matter. In his separate
dissenting opinion, Thomas aptly characterized Raich as supplying yet
another epitaph for judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers
scheme: "Diane Monson and Angel Raich use marijuana that has never
been bought or sold, that has never crossed state lines, and that has had
no demonstrable effect on the national market for marijuana. If Congress
can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtu-
ally anything-and the Federal Government is no longer one of limited
and enumerated powers."'30 ' In light of the majority's all-encompassing
definition of economics:
"[The Federal Government may now regulate quilting
bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the
50 States. This makes a mockery of Madison's assur-
ance to the people of New York that the 'powers dele-
gated' to the Federal Government are 'few and defined,'
298 Raich, 545 U.S. at 41 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 561 (1995)) (emphasis added by Justice Scalia).
299 Id.
300 To be sure, Scalia also noted that, in Lopez, "the Government [had] not attempt[ed] to
justify the statute on the basis of that relationship." Id. at 41 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring). Still,
it would diminish Lopez to an obscurity to read it as ultimately amounting to nothing more
than the product of incomplete advocacy in support of the Act therein invalidated.
301 Id. at 57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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while those of the States are 'numerous and indefinite.'
One searches the Court's opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect
of American life is reserved to the States. 3°2
The irony, of course, is that, when confronted with a case dividing
the American political right-wing's social conservative and libertarian
constituencies, the nominally pro-federalism Rehnquist Court, in one of
its very last constitutional decisions, endorsed a reading of congressional
power so broad as to be virtually unlimited. Of the Justices still on the
Court today, only Thomas remained steadfast in a principled commit-
ment to federalism. Taking up the role McReynolds played in the 1920s
and 30s, Thomas suffers a similar irony and intellectual isolation. Like
McReynolds, Thomas endures demonization by the political left, who are
opposed to any general limitation of congressional power. 30 3 At the
same time, Thomas's usual defenders maintain a thunderous silence, un-
willing to acknowledge the intellectual dishonesty of his fair-weather
federalist colleagues. With the possible exception of the formal legal
literature,30 4 the truth Thomas's constancy exposes remains for the pre-
sent obscured. But like the Taft and Hughes Courts, the Roberts Court
will not long sustain a federalism doctrine erected on such a precarious
foundation.
B. LETTING FEDERALISM DIE WITH DIGNITY
Like the early twentieth-century Supreme Court's exoneration of
Dr. Linder, who had been charged with violating the Harrison Act by
what he believed to be sound, lawful medical practice, 30 5 the Supreme
Court's vindication of Oregon's Death With Dignity Act provided a tem-
porary reprieve from the federal government's use of the narcotics laws
as a relentless engine of centralization. In both cases, however, the re-
prieve was more symbolic than real. In both cases, the Court's opinions
contained within them invitations to further expansion of federal author-
302 Id. at 69, 70 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
303 See BOND, supra note 88, at 135 (noting the New Dealers' singular disdain for Justice
McReynolds). See generally ScoTT DOUGLAS GERBER, First Principles: The Jurisprudence of
Clarence Thomas, (1999) (discussing the unusually vitriolic nature of Justice Thomas's left-
leaning critics).
304 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, "Tucker's Rule": St. George Tucker and the Limited Con-
struction of Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1390 (2006) (observing that
"[a]lthough local autonomy may limit federal power to pass legislation like ... the Violence
Against Women Act, a vigorous application of the same rule would protect the right of Cali-
fornia citizens to authorize medicinal use of marijuana and the right of Oregon residents to
authorize physician assisted suicide") (citation omitted).
305 See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 22-23 (1925).
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ity to suppress whatever Congress (and the Justices) deemed to be
immoral.
Justice Kennedy, who just over six months earlier had silently
joined the Raich majority, wrote the opinion for the Court in Gonzales v.
Oregon,306 which rejected Attorney General John Ashcroft's conclusion
that the CSA precluded physicians from acting under Oregon's Death
With Dignity Act (ODWDA). (One wit observed that, after this ruling,
federal law forbade marijuana prescriptions because, unlike the drugs at
issue in the Oregon case, they didn't kill patients.) In pertinent part, and
subject to extensive procedural protections, ODWDA authorized Oregon
physicians to prescribe lethal doses of certain drugs when asked to do so
by terminally ill patients. 30 7 Those drugs were covered by the CSA, and
on November 9, 2001, Ashcroft issued an interpretative rule reversing
the position of the Clinton Justice Department and declaring that using
controlled substances to assist a patient's suicide was not a legitimate
medical practice. 30 8  Accordingly, a physician's adherence with
ODWDA was prohibited by the federal statute, so construed. Oregon
challenged the rule in federal court, 309 and the Supreme Court sided with
the state, concluding that the Attorney General had misconstrued the
CSA.
According to Justice Kennedy, the CSA "manifest[ed] no intent to
regulate the practice of medicine generally. '310 This outcome accorded
with "the structure and limitations of federalism, which allow the States
great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons. ' 311 Echoing
Justice McReynolds's opinion for the Court in Linder, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that medical practice was an "area[ ] traditionally supervised
by the States,"312 and that States were therefore free to choose among
competing understandings of what constituted acceptable conduct by a
physician in service of a patient's comfort and wishes. 313 Of course, the
same claim had been made in support of California's conclusion that
proper medical practice might in some cases include prescription of ma-
rijuana. Like McReynolds in Linder, Kennedy stressed the narrowness
306 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
307 Id. at 251 (discussing Oregon statute).
308 Id.
309 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (2002).
310 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 270 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
311 Id.
312 Id. at 274. Justice Kennedy deemed it "unnecessary even to consider the application
of [federalism] clear statement requirements or presumptions against preemption to reach this
commonsense conclusion." Id. (citations omitted).
313 Id. at 286 ("The primary problem with the Government's argument, however, is its
assumption that the CSA impliedly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use simply because
it may be inconsistent with one reasonable understanding of medical practice.").
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of the Court's holding. Citing Raich, Kennedy explained that, "[e]ven
though regulation of health and safety is primarily, and historically, a
matter of local concern, . . . there is no question that the Federal Govern-
ment can set uniform standards in these areas.' 314 Whereas McReyn-
olds's opinion in Linder subtly foreshadowed the Court's subsequent
reaffirmation of Doremus in Nigro, Kennedy's opinion expressly and au-
thoritatively confirmed the implication of Raich: that meaningful judicial
efforts to cabin the powers of Congress were at an end.
As if there were any lingering doubt on this score, Justice Scalia,
dissenting, went out of his way to signal that Congress enjoyed virtually
unlimited authority to regulate public morality. Citing Hoke and Cham-
pion,3 15 Scalia observed that "[f]rom an early time in our national his-
tory, the Federal Government has used its enumerated powers, such as its
power to regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting pub-
lic morality. '316 Of course, Justice Scalia neglected to mention that the
cited cases applied only to persons and articles which had crossed state
lines, whereas the CSA applied without regard to any analogous limita-
tion, as the facts of Raich so glaringly demonstrated. 317 Ignoring this
difference, Scalia reasoned that "[u]nless we are to repudiate a long and
well-established principle of our jurisprudence, using the federal com-
merce power to prevent assisted suicide is unquestionably permissi-
ble."'318 Indeed, in broad, concluding language-to the effect that the
CSA "surely excludes the prescription of drugs to produce death" 319-
Scalia arguably welcomed congressional regulation, if not outright prohi-
bition, of abortion.
To this extent, he espoused a position reminiscent of the White
Court's contemporaneous defenders. They tolerated federal regulation of
sex, booze, and drugs, but not child labor, which they were unwilling to
regard as a moral problem. 320 Justice Scalia likewise acknowledges the
propriety of federal morals regulations, but refuses to recognize that, for
many, guns in schools and violence against women present moral
314 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 271 (emphasis added).
315 See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
316 Oregon, 546 U.S at 230.
317 Indeed, the record in Raich established that her marijuana was "grown using only soil,
water, nutrients, equipment, supplies, and lumber originating from or manufactured within
California." Brief for the Respondents at 6-7, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-
1454).
318 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 299.
319 Id.
320 See, e.g., Green, supra note 125, at 6 (arguing that lotteries, adultery, liquor and nar-
cotics were intrinsically "evil," whereas "to employ children of 13 in factories or of 15 in
quarries or mines . . . [was] not immoral").
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problems at least as acute as those traceable to medical use of marijuana
or physician-assisted suicide by the terminally ill.321
IV. DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN?
The preceding discussion sought to establish that the same kinds of
inconsistencies that proved fatal to early twentieth-century judicial ef-
forts to enforce a meaningful federalism also plague the Rehnquist
Court's federalism revival. More specifically, history teaches that, in
both contexts, the Supreme Court's first failures came in cases concern-
ing federalism challenges to congressional statutes prohibiting narcotics
use. Identification of this parallel is significant in its own right, as recent
scholarly debate has accorded it scant attention. 322 But this parallel in-
vites further questions, such as why do the past's mistakes seem to be
repeating themselves? And what, if anything, does this evident cycling
teach about the Rehnquist Court's likely legacy?
A central dispute in much of the legal literature concerning Raich is
whether it marks the end of the Lopez revolution or merely a minor di-
version from the course Lopez had launched (whatever course that may
have been). Commentators have championed both views. Advocates of
the former account have concluded that Raich signals the Justices' con-
clusion that Lopez and Morrison were extraordinary cases unlikely to sire
progeny. 323 On this reading, Raich marks the Court's return to the pre-
321 Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent. In his separate opinion, Justice
Thomas made clear that he held fast to his position in Raich-that "the applications of the
CSA" should be limited to accord with "the principles of federalism and our constitutional
structure." Oregon, 546 U.S. at 301 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But, in his view, "Respondents'
acceptance of Raich foreclose[d] their constitutional challenge." Id. at 301 n.2.
322 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
323 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme (Drug) Law
Overdose, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 751, 777 (2005) (concluding that Raich repudiated Lopez
and Morrison); Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist
Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 818 (2005) (arguing that Raich reveals that even a
dedicated "coalition of judicial conservatives would not be unified enough to undo the New
Deal transformation of Congress's powers"); Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA.
L. REV. 705, 719 (2005-2006) (asserting that "Raich turns Lopez's substantive limitations on
what activities Congress can constitutionally regulate into procedural limits that Congress will
generally be able to easily overcome"); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich:
The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 823, 844 (2005) ("Lopez and
Morrison have been largely confined to their facts."); John T. Parry, "Society Must be [Regu-
lated]": Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEwis & CLARK L.
REV. 853, 859 (2005) (arguing that Raich teaches "that Wickard is the heart of Commerce
Clause doctrine, while Lopez and Morrison are, if not outliers, at least cases that merely police
the outer boundaries of the doctrine to ensure that Congress is regulating economic activity in
the broad sense defined by Raich"); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath
Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 915, 932 (2005) (expressing doubt
that "a robust judicially-enforceable federalism has much future left" after Raich); Smith,
supra note 18, at 955 ("The most enduring legacy of the Rehnquist Court might simply be its
failure to convince those of us with an understandable skepticism about invocations of federal-
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Lopez status quo, which recognized virtually no limits on Congress's
Commerce Clause authority. Others have argued that Raich, rather than
Lopez or Morrison, constitutes the outlier, which will pose no obstacle to
the continuation of the Rehnquist Court's modest judicial-enforcement-
of-federalism revival.324
Only the passage of time under the Roberts Court will conclusively
resolve this debate. But history strongly suggests that, even if Lopez and
Morrison held promise of a return to meaningful judicial enforcement of
the enumerated powers scheme, Raich will, sooner or later, prove fatal to
that hope. The Court has already once attempted to stretch congressional
powers to encompass plenary authority over all aspects of narcotics use,
including related medical practice, while simultaneously preserving ro-
bust judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers scheme. That at-
tempt failed when the exceptions for drugs and other morals regulations
eventually swallowed the rule limiting Congress's authority to the dis-
crete matters clearly embraced by Article I, Section 8. The Court's com-
promise of federalism could not be cabined to drug or even all morals
laws, but rather vexed all ensuing judicial efforts to patrol the boundaries
of congressional power.
This history, in turn, raises the question of why partial judicial fed-
eralism proved unstable. The Taft and Hughes Courts' critics offered an
answer at the time: a partial federalism was in fact no federalism at all. It
was instead a mask for policymaking outside the sphere of judicial com-
petency and legitimacy. Inchoate judicial weighing of policy corrupted
the Court's efforts to restrict congressional power. Constitutional law
was subsumed by politics more properly the domain of the people's
ism that federalism can in fact be applied in a neutral and principled fashion."); Somin, supra
note 18, at 118 (asserting that Raich "virtually eviscerated" Lopez and Morrison); Ilya Somin,
Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 507 (2005) (contending that "Raich represents a major-possibly even terminal-set-
back for efforts to impose meaningful judicial constraints on Congress' Commerce Clause
powers"); Young, supra note 18, at 39-40 (speculating that "Raich most likely marks the outer
bound of the Court's ambition in Commerce Clause cases" and "may indicate that even minor
incursions on the federal edifice are unlikely ... except in cases where to uphold the federal
act would remove any limit whatsoever").
324 See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Why Not Heighten the Scrutiny of Congressional Power
When the States Undertake Policy Experiments?, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 779, 781 (2005)
(concluding that Raich constituted a "conventional and predictable" decision, which should not
be viewed as a "betrayal of the principle of limiting the commerce power articulated in" Lopez
and Morrison); Brown, supra note 18, at 986 (viewing "the opinion and result in [Raich] as
more of a stopping point, a refusal to extend, than any form of serious cutting back of the basic
thrust of Lopez and Morrison"); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., "The Medical Marijuana Case: A Com-
merce Clause Counter-revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 908 (2005) (arguing that
"it is premature to pronounce Raich the death knell of the Rehnquist Court's Commerce
Clause revolution"); cf Randy Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEwiS & CLARK L. REV.
743, 744 (2005) (describing how a future Supreme Court majority, desirous of protecting fed-
eralism but unwilling to overrule Raich, might read it narrowly).
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elected and accountable representatives. In short, to the extent that the
calculus turned on questions of policy priorities, the Justices lost all
claim to superiority relative to the political branches in the execution of
American federalism.
This contemporaneous analysis is consonant with both the external
and internal accounts of the New Deal era constitutional crisis reflected
in modern scholarship. If, as the conventional historical narrative posits,
the New Deal Court sharply altered course in response to political pres-
sures emanating from the Roosevelt White House, then the Court's con-
temporary critics had facilitated this result by undermining the
institution's capacity to resist these pressures. 325 As we have seen, those
critics relentlessly exposed the, at best, mercurial and, at worst, hypocrit-
ical nature of the Justices' invocation of federalism. By so doing, these
commentators impeached the Justices' claims of fidelity to legal princi-
ple apart from and even in opposition to their personal policy prefer-
ences. Partisanship, public disinterest and ignorance, fatigue, and inertia
permitted the Justices to avoid immediate individual accountability when
they compromised their official integrity. But ultimately these com-
promises took their toll by subverting the Justices' only shelter in a sus-
tained crisis-the public's confidence that they are effectuating policy
judgments logically and morally prior to their own. 326 In this way, the
traditional account suggests that the Court's Harrison Act and other
morals regulations cases were a significant source of the forces that ulti-
mately compelled the Court to abandon federalism enforcement
altogether.
More recent, revisionist scholarship, however, contends that the
Court's post-1936 rulings sustaining New Deal legislation were more the
product of the Court's internal efforts to achieve coherence, and thus
equilibrium, in its own jurisprudence than the result of a sudden abdica-
tion to external, political pressure. 327 If so, then White and Taft Court
concessions to broad congressional assertions of power in the context of
morals regulations play an even more direct causal role in the creation
and resolution of the New Deal Court's transformation of federalism.
For these concessions must be counted among the first cracks in the
foundation of the turn-of-the-century legal order. Indeed, the revisionist
interpretations of the Court's late- 1930s abandonment of federalism indi-
cate that the doctrinal analogs to Ptolemaic epicycles 328 necessary to
325 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
326 See CURRIE, supra note 121, at xii (1985) (observing that "when a judge swears to
uphold the Constitution, he promises obedience to a set of rules laid down by someone else").
327 See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 222, at 5; WHITE, supra note 214, at 1-4.
328 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF ScIENTrFic REVOLUTIONS 168 (2d ed.
1970) (discussing the introduction of epicycles and epi-epicycles in an ultimately futile effort
to reconcile Ptolemaic astronomical theory with observed reality).
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abide apparently inconsistent application of legal principles created de-
stabilizing forces within the Court. For example, Professor Cushman
finds greater continuity than the external account acknowledges between
the Hughes Court's interpretations of the Commerce Clause in Schechter
Poultry and Carter Coal, on the one hand, and Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., on the other. Rather than a sharp break with the past, the Jones &
Laughlin case constituted the logical fruition of the Court's longstanding
recognition of congressional power to protect the "stream of commerce"
from interruption. 329 Similarly, Professor White roots the New Deal
era's constitutional evolution in the broader context of the thirty years of
constitutional doctrine expounded by the White, Taft, and Hughes
Courts. Developments in the law governing executive discretion in for-
eign affairs, the structure and function of federal administrative agencies,
and the freedoms of speech and the press laid the intellectual foundation
for parallel progression in the Court's understanding of the constitutional
limits on Congress's power to regulate the national economy. 330 Com-
mon to Cushman and White is the revelation that legal doctrine and its
intellectual presuppositions drove and shaped the Court's New Deal era
constitutional decisions.
In both accounts, by the late 1930s tensions between accommoda-
tions already made and hard-line resistance to further change required
resolution. These tensions were of the Court's own making and existed
aside from any external pressure President Roosevelt brought to bear on
the Court in the wake of his 1936 reelection. The Court resolved these
tensions by bringing its economic substantive due process and commerce
clause doctrine into accord with other recently "modernized" areas of its
jurisprudence. Most significant in this revised history is the recognition
of some substantial independent force to the Justices' obligation to
achieve some manner of doctrinal coherence.
Of course this understanding of federalism's first death offers in-
sight into the probable, long-term significance of the Raich and Oregon
cases. Today's doctrinal inconsistencies will produce their own destabi-
lizing pressures. Thus, without any need to conjure spectacular scenarios
of future inter-branch collisions comparable to the court-packing crisis,
one can foresee how the Court's recent compromise of its commitment to
federalism will introduce into the legal doctrine tensions and uncertain-
ties, which will in time likely work federalism's third death.
It might be tempting to deduce from the similarity between the past
and more recent events a proof of a sort of historical inevitability to the
329 See CUSHMAN, supra note 222, at 175-76.
330 See generally WHrrE, supra note 214, at 225-36 (situating evolution of the Hughes
Court's Commerce Clause doctrine in broader jurisprudential context).
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failure of judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers scheme. 33'
Such a constitutional determinism would explain, if not excuse, the
Rehnquist Court's disregard of history's examples and confirm the judg-
ment espoused by many across numerous generations that the political
safeguards of federalism must be sole mechanisms for securing this as-
pect of our constitutional structure. 332 The apparent prescription would
be that the Court ought to announce, loudly and irrevocably, its with-
drawal from the field, the only avoidable harm being the public reliance
induced by the Court's pretense of federalism enforcement. 333 This ac-
count, however, submerges the open divisions among the Justices and
ignores the internal consistency of the Doremus, Nigro, and Raich dis-
senters. The persistence and clarity of these voices suggests that individ-
ual human judgment and character matter, and that the Justices need not
be blind to the Court's inconsistencies and their effects.
These observations speak to a more general, jurisprudential debate.
Supreme Court scholars struggle mightily to construct models that mea-
sure the extent to which doctrine drives the Justices' decision-making. 334
Whereas most contemporary legal scholars implicitly assume "that court
decisions are based centrally upon reasoned arguments of the type taught
in law school, ' 335 other commentators, particularly political scientists,
maintain that Justices' individual policy and ideological preferences in-
fluence their votes far more than any of the doctrinal syllogisms that
dominate most legal scholarship, appellate briefs, and indeed judicial
331 Cf Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of American Federalism: Some
Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 637, 697 (2005-2006) (stressing "the in-
complete, ambiguous, and ambivalent nature of American constitutional federalism itself' and
questioning "whether, and to what extent, it is possible for 'federalism' to serve as a meaning-
ful and independent norm in the nation's constitutional enterprise" by guiding judges "to 'cor-
rect' decisions or, at least," by eliminating "wide ranges of discretion in such decision
making").
332 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954);
JESSIE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980);
D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immu-
nity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH.U. L.Q. 779 (1982); see also Garcia v.
San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.ll (1985).
333 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Com-
merce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 720 (1996) (arguing that "instead of seeking to reactivate
federalism review, the Court should make its withdrawal from the area explicit" and that "[t]he
result would be that the Court would cease facilitating the growth of national power-the
present effect of federalism review-and make an enormous and much needed contribution to
the cause of honesty in constitutional law").
334 See generally Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 252-54 (1997) (contrasting
legal model of judicial decision-making with then-emerging "attitudinal" model reflected in
political science literature regarding the Supreme Court).
335 Id. at 252.
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opinions.336 Moreover, the federalism decisions of both the Rehnquist
and the Hughes Courts have been both scrutinized under and adduced as
evidence for this "attitudinal" model. 337
As interesting and important as these studies are, they neglect the
opportunity this that history affords to recast the inquiry. Regardless of
the subjective motivations of particular judges and justices, questions
about the Court's legitimate function and institutional capacity remain.
Federalism's forgotten first death in the White and Taft Courts teaches
that doctrine matters, even as it illustrates the Justices' short-term capac-
ity to manipulate legal rules to effect their own policy objectives. In-
deed, it is the very fragility of legal doctrine that ultimately supplies its
power to constrain the Justices. The Supreme Court's limited capacity to
persist in opposition to the popular but constitutionally dubious actions
of the overtly political branches depends (in the long if not the short run)
on the credibility of the Justices' claims of fidelity to legal principle apart
from and even in opposition to their personal policy preferences. Parti-
sanship, public disinterest and ignorance, fatigue, and inertia permit the
Justices to avoid immediate, direct, and individual accountability when
they compromise their official integrity. But ultimately these com-
promises take their toll by subverting the Justices' only shelter in a sus-
tained crisis: namely, the public's belief that they effectuate policy
judgments logically and morally prior to their own.338 This belief consti-
tutes the sole foundation of the Court's genuine and lasting authority; the
Court "may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely
judgment. '339
More specifically, reflection on the ways in which the White and
Taft Courts' compromise of federalism principles circumscribed the ca-
pacity of the Hughes Court to persevere in enforcement of the enumer-
ated powers doctrine reveals a manner in which legal principle can
constrain. To date, political scientists seek to test the constraining power
of either an individual Justice's professional conscience or the potential
for adverse action by another branch of government. 340 Judicial consid-
eration of the latter sort of potential constraints is labeled "strategic" in
the sense a Justice might alter behavior in anticipation of, and in hope of
336 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrlUDINAL MODEL (1993); see also Cross, supra note 334, at 252 n.4.
337 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304,
1309-10 (1999); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court
Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 45 (1992).
338 See CURRIE, supra note 121, at xii (1985) (observing that "when a judge swears to
uphold the Constitution, he promises obedience to a set of rules laid down by someone else").
339 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
340 See generally Cross, supra note 334, at 255.
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influencing, actors elsewhere in the federal government. A different kind
of strategy, illustrated by the first death of federalism, is unremarked.
Our hypothetical strategic Justice would no doubt on occasion adjust her
position not just to defuse confrontations with other branches of govern-
ment but also to enhance the credibility of her claims to be bound by law,
mindful as to how that credibility would likely be assessed by the bar and
especially her judicial colleagues. These types of strategic considera-
tions internal to the Court might in part explain why doctrinal incoher-
ence proved fatal to the Hughes Court's efforts to enforce federalism as
revisionist treatments suggest.
CONCLUSION
Drug abuse provokes intense reactions, both physical and emo-
tional. This was just as true a century ago. The beginning of the end of
the White and Taft Courts' efforts to constrain Congress to its enumer-
ated powers can be traced to rulings rejecting valid federalism objections
to early national narcotics laws. Ironically, the Rehnquist Court's efforts
to revive meaningful judicial federalism faltered when confronted with
the same social problem. It also seems likely that the Roberts Court will
prove no more successful in executing a judicial policy of selective fed-
eralism than did the Hughes Court when tested by the New Deal. Thus,
the Rehnquist Court's most lasting legacy may be as an exemplar of
George Santayana's famous observation that "[t]hose who cannot re-
member the past are condemned to repeat it. ''341
341 George Santyana, Reason in Common Sense, 1905-1906, quoted in Familiar Quota-
tions-John Bartlett 703 (15th ed. 1980).
